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Articles 
GUESS WHAT GUCCI?  POST-SALE 
CONFUSION EXISTS IN EUROPE 
P. Sean Morris∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Can consumers be confused with the similarities of the signs 
“limoncello” and “limonchelo” or “Och-Ziff” and “OchCapital”?  Most 
likely to some degree.  The narrative in this Article could easily be about 
sour lemons and money, or the lifestyles of John Doe and Mary Jane 
down the street, or that of their affluent neighbors, Mr. and Mrs. 
Highflyerberg, at the top of the street.  But it is not.  This narrative delves 
deeper into the complex issue of post-sale confusion with a unique 
European dimension.   
While still on the subject of sour lemons and money, imagine you are 
a longtime investor with a private equity firm, and you happen to be in 
town for a social event.  You stroll across the street from your hotel and 
come across a familiar sign displaying your longtime private equity firm.  
Unaware that the firm changed offices or is using a new name, you are a 
bit confused and not sure what to think of the new name and sign.  In 
order to put your doubts to rest, you call the firm’s CEO on his mobile.  
When he picks up the mobile phone, you state, “I see that you’ve 
moved.”  Dumbstruck by your statement, the CEO asks, “What do you 
mean?”  You then begin to explain your confusion regarding the 
trademarks on display.  That is exactly what happened in Och-Ziff 
Management Europe Ltd. v. Och Capital LLP, where the court found that 
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Research Scholar, Intellectual Property Law at the Chair for Intellectual Property Law and 
Graduate School in Intellectual Property & the Public Domain, University of Bayreuth 
Germany, April–July 2012, where this Article was completed in May 2012.  This Article was 
written in conjunction with a travel grant from the IPR University Center, Finland and the 
Emil Aaltonen Foundation.  The author would like to thank Professor Ansgar Ohly, Chair, 
Intellectual Property Law, University of Bayreuth and the staff at the Law & Economics 
Library, for their hospitality and assistance.  I am also indebted to the staff of this Journal 
for their excellent editing and assistance in bringing this Article to publication and also for 
capturing eloquently some areas where my thoughts were cumbersome.  A note on 
household matters:  the term senior mark refers to the rightful trademark owner who was 
first to register the mark for use in commerce, whilst junior user is a reference to the 
newcomer and alleged infringer.  Similarly, the spelling has been standardized so that 
“trade mark” becomes “trademark” and “harmonise” becomes “harmonize.”  Otherwise, 
original spelling such as German, French, or Dutch is retained. 
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the junior mark infringed the senior mark.1  The main point here is that 
trademark confusion covers all manner of things, and even sophisticated 
consumers can be confused as to the origin of goods or services when 
they see a trademark.2 
Proving confusion is perhaps one of the most difficult aspects of 
trademark infringement cases.  The statute that governs trademarks in 
the European Union (“EU”), the Trademark Directive (“TMD”), states 
that infringement may occur where there is a “likelihood of confusion.”3  
There are several confusion-based theories that create a conundrum 
when dealing with infringement cases.4  The difficulty arises when 
deciding which confusion-based theory to apply to an infringement 
case,5 because courts have not uniformly applied the likelihood of 
confusion test.6  In Sabel v. Puma, the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (“CJEU”) interpreted the threshold for the likelihood of confusion 
test, explaining that the average consumer’s point of view is important 
when determining the “the global appreciation of the likelihood of 
confusion.”7  Even this statement by the CJEU is problematic because it 
                                                 
1 Och-Ziff Mgmt. Eur. Ltd. v. Och Capital LLP, 2011 E.T.M.R. 1. 
2 If seeing is believing, the signs in questions were the following: 
Junior: Senior:  
3 Directive 2008/95/EC, art. 5(1)(b), 2008 O.J. (L 299) [hereinafter TMD].  Article 5(1)(b), 
states: 
[A]ny sign where, because of its identity with, or similarity to, the 
trade mark and the identity or similarity of the goods or services 
covered by the trade mark and the sign, there exists a likelihood of 
confusion on the part of the public; the likelihood of confusion includes the 
likelihood of association between the sign and the trade mark. 
Id. at 29 (emphasis added). 
4 See generally GRAEME B. DINWOODIE & MARK D. JANIS, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION:  LAW AND POLICY 459–527 (3d ed. 2010). 
5 E.g., id. at 467 (“[E]stablishing that ‘confusion’ is governing standard for trademark 
infringement liability leaves open many questions.”) (emphasis added). 
6 See, e.g., Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elects. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961) 
(articulating eight factors to be considered when assessing likelihood of confusion). 
7 Case C-251/95, Sabel BV v. Puma AG, 1997 E.C.R. I-6214, I-6224.  The other major 
cases in relation to confusion under Article 5(1)(b) of the TMD include:  Case C-334/05 P, 
OHIM v. Shaker di L. Laudato & C. Sas, 2007 E.C.R. I-4541; Case C-120/04, Medion AG v. 
Thomson Multimedia Sales Ger. & Austria GmbH, 2005 E.C.R. I-8565; Case C-3/03 P, 
Matrazen Concord GmbH v. OHIM, 2004 E.C.R. I-3660; Case C-425/98, Marca Mode CV v. 
Adidas AG, 2000 E.C.R. I-4881; Case C-342/97, Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer & Co. GmbH v. 
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introduces an additional interpretation—the global appreciation 
standard for the likelihood of confusion.8  The nature of confusion is 
broad and non-exhaustive, and it further splinters into sub-groups, such 
as post-sale confusion. 
This Article shifts the dynamics from confusion, or its likelihood, to 
the narrower notion of post-sale confusion in trademark law.9  There are 
three major instances in which confusion can occur in trademark 
infringement cases:  (1) initial interest (pre-sale) confusion, (2) point of 
sale confusion, and (3) post-sale confusion.10  Post-sale confusion is 
arguably the most complex and the least understood of the three 
doctrines, which may be why it is often sidelined in the debate on 
confusion.11  On the one hand, the CJEU accepted the doctrine of post-
sale confusion in cases such as Arsenal Football Club Plc v. Reed; on the 
other hand, advocate generals have questioned the doctrine, as seen in 
                                                                                                             
Klijsen Handel BV, 1999 E.C.R. I-3830; Case C-39/97, Canon Kabushiki Kaisha v. Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Inc., 1998 E.C.R. I-5525. 
8 See infra Part II.B.2 (providing an in-depth discussion of the global appreciation 
standard). 
9 There has long been a discussion on post-sale confusion in relation to trademarks in 
American intellectual property jurisprudence; however, the discussion is relatively new in 
European intellectual property jurisprudence.  See, e.g., LIONEL BENTLY & BRAD SHERMAN, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 874 (3d ed. 2009) (stating that post-sale confusion has been 
“[o]ne topic on which there has been some discussion [of] the extent to which the views of 
consumers who see the product away from the point of sale are relevant to a determination 
of ‘likelihood of confusion’”); see also DINWOODIE & JANIS, supra note 4, 495–96 (discussing 
the differing ways the international community approaches “keyword” litigation); Anne 
M. McCarthy, Note, The Post-Sale Confusion Doctrine:  Why the General Public Should Be 
Included in the Likelihood of Confusion Inquiry, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 3337, 3338 (1999) (“[T]he 
use of a trademark likely to cause confusion among the general public in a post-sale context 
should be actionable under [U.S.] federal trademark law.”); Michael A. Johnson, The 
Waning Consumer Protection Rationale of Trademark Law:  Overprotective Courts and the Path to 
Stifling Post-Sale Consumer Use, 101 TRADEMARK REP. 1320, 1323 (2011) (“[C]ourts have 
actually overprotected consumers from confusion through fringe doctrines such as post-
sale confusion.”) (footnote omitted).  See generally David M. Tichane, The Maturing 
Trademark Doctrine of Post-Sales Confusion, 85 TRADEMARK REP. 399, 399 (1995) (giving a 
robust overview of the development of the post-sale confusion doctrine in American 
trademark law and noting that “[t]he growth of the doctrine coincided with the judicial 
expansion of both the population to be protected from confusion and the types of product 
traits which are entitled to trademark protection”); Steven John Olsen, Note, Mixed Signals 
in Trademark’s “Likelihood of Confusion Law”: Does Quality Matter?, 44 VAL. U. L. REV. 659 
(2010) (discussing the landscape of the American circuit courts in attempting to determine 
the proper interpretation of the likelihood of confusion doctrine). 
10 See infra note 39 and accompanying text (providing a helpful background for these 
three concepts). 
11 See David Ehrlich, When Should Post-Sale Confusion Prevent Use or Registration of Mark?, 
81 TRADEMARK REP. 267, 279 (1991) (examining the reasons why courts refuse to apply the 
post-sale confusion doctrine). 
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Alcon v. OHIM.12  After considering these cases, a narrow discussion of 
post-sale confusion will thrust it back into the spotlight for serious 
analysis in both the academic and judicial contours of European 
trademark law.  In Datacard Corp. v. Eagle Technologies Ltd., the English 
High Court found that the likelihood of confusion doctrine encompasses 
post-sale confusion, even though a finding of post-sale confusion is not 
required.13  This decision arguably reinvigorated the nature of post-sale 
confusion in European trademark law.  However, the decision failed to 
discuss the post-sale confusion factors, merely acknowledging that post-
sale confusion exists as part of the likelihood of confusion.14 
Nevertheless, a discussion of post-sale confusion requires an 
understanding of the broader context of the court’s jurisprudence on the 
likelihood of confusion in trademark law, as it has been developed and 
understood.  Part II of this Article explores the notion of likelihood of 
confusion and its relevance when determining post-sale confusion.15  
This section also discusses the intricacies involved in the various 
likelihood of confusion standards, culminating in an analysis of the 
global appreciation standard.16  The courts have explained that the 
average consumer is central when determining the likelihood of 
confusion, and the globalness of the goods must also be appreciated.17  In 
Part III, the discussion then shifts from the broad notion of likelihood of 
confusion to the narrower notion of post-sale confusion.18  This section 
gives an account of how post-sale confusion has been constructed in 
English and Dutch Courts, and then turns the spotlight on how the CJEU 
interpreted post-sale confusion.19  Part III concludes with some 
comments on the future of post-sale confusion and its nexus with 
counterfeit goods.20  Part IV relocates post-sale confusion into the 
                                                 
12 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, Case C-412/05, Alcon v. OHIM, 2006 E.C.R. I-
3573, I-3586.  “Other points in time, at which confusion on the part of the consumers might 
be more likely because they display a lesser level of attention, are by contrast of secondary 
importance.”  Id. (footnote omitted). 
13 Datacard Corp. v. Eagle Techs. Ltd., [2011] EWHC (Pat) 244, [280] (Eng.). 
14 Id. 
15 See infra Part II (examining when the likelihood of confusion is relevant in making a 
post-sale confusion determination). 
16 See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing cases that illustrate the various standards and 
explaining that the global appreciation standard should be central in trademark 
infringement cases). 
17 See id. (describing the global appreciation standard in detail). 
18 See infra Part III (describing the nature of post-sale confusion in European trademark 
law). 
19 See infra Part III.B.1.a (summarizing the Dutch courts’ approach to post-sale 
confusion). 
20 See infra Part III.B.4 (explaining how the doctrine of post-sale confusion applies to 
counterfeit goods). 
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uncertain universe of “blurring” by analyzing Schechter’s notion of 
blurring and how cases, such as Gucci America, Inc. v. Guess?, Inc., 
embody the latest extrapolation of post-sale confusion.21  Finally, Part V 
concludes the discussion, emphasizing the need to develop a form-factor 
test to ensure a smooth application of post-sale confusion by lower 
courts.22 
II.  UNDERSTANDING LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION 
The TMD requires only a likelihood of confusion in an infringement 
case instead of actual confusion.23  In other jurisdictions, such as the 
United States, similar provisions can be found for trademark 
infringement.24  According to Black’s Law Dictionary, the word 
“confusion,” as it relates to trademarks, is defined as “[a] consumer’s 
mistaken belief about the origin of goods or services.”25  If a consumer is 
led to believe that his beloved soccer shirt did not originate from his 
soccer team, but rather it was a local knock-off, the consumer would 
most likely be disappointed.  Here the consumer was deceived, actually 
confused into thinking that he was purchasing his soccer team’s original 
shirt.26  Such was the situation in Arsenal, where consumers thought they 
                                                 
21 See infra Part IV (discussing the trend of courts to blur the notion of post-sale 
confusion). 
22 See infra Part V (suggesting what the European High Court should develop to ensure a 
smooth and consistent application of the post-sale confusion doctrine). 
23 See TMD, supra note 3, at art. 5(1)(b); see also Case C-119/10, Frisdranken Industrie 
Winters BV v. Red Bull GmbH, 2011 E.C.R. ¶ 25 (confirming likelihood of confusion on the 
part of the public); Case C-533/06, O2 Holdings and 02 (UK) Ltd. v. Hutchison 3G UK Ltd., 
2008 E.C.R. I-4231, ¶ 57 (confirming that a trademark owner may take legal action if his 
trademark is infringed under the likelihood of confusion test).  The likelihood of confusion 
test was more eloquently elaborated upon in the recital of the TMD: 
The likelihood of confusion, the appreciation of which depends on 
numerous elements and, in particular, on the recognition of the trade 
mark on the market, the association which can be made with the used 
or registered sign, the degree of similarity between the trade mark and 
the sign and between the goods and services identified . . . . 
TMD, supra note 3, at recital 11.  See also Case T-346/04, Sadas SA v. OHIM, 2005 E.C.R. II-
4894, II-4903, ¶ 27 (asserting that case law on the likelihood of confusion must be assessed 
globally). 
24 The Lanham Act, under section 32 for registered trademarks and section 43(a) for 
unregistered marks, outlines, inter alia, the requirements for likelihood of confusion.  
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125 (2006).  This is not a comparative discussion; thus, 
references will be mostly to the United States and the United Kingdom for ease of access to 
case law and statues. 
25 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 320 (8th ed. 2004). 
26 A word of warning regarding the usage of the terms “deceived,” “deception,” and 
“confusion.”  I use deceived to also mean confusion, but such usage can be misleading.  
However, the usage is based partly on the fact that courts have also used deception to 
Morris: Guess What Gucci?  Post-Sale Confusion Exists in Europe
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2012
6 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47 
were purchasing the team’s real soccer shirt from a local vendor who 
was also a supporter of the soccer team.27 
In Arsenal, the court explained that the use of the trademark was 
“such as to create the impression that there is a material link” from the 
goods sold by the vendor to the trademark “Arsenal,” which is owned 
by the Arsenal Football Club Plc.28  The court held that consumers “may 
interpret the sign as designating Arsenal FC as the undertaking of origin 
of the goods.”29  This decision by the CJEU hinted at the importance of 
global assessment—the holy grail of post-sale confusion cases in 
Europe—but left post-sale confusion in a state of hibernation.  Similar to 
the TMD, the Community Trade Marks Regulation (“CTMR”) offers 
almost identical wording for the notion of likelihood of confusion.30  The 
language of the CTMR does not greatly differ from the TMD; however, 
under the nuances of the EU, the Community trademark (“CTM”) offers 
trademark protection throughout the entire EU, while the TMD 
provisions apply only to member states of the EU.31  These two pieces of 
legislation complement each other so that both must be considered in 
determining the exact tone of likelihood of confusion.32  The CTMR 
ensures that trademark owners can argue likelihood of confusion claims 
in a wide geographic area.33  In an effort to understand the likelihood of 
                                                                                                             
mean confusion.  See JAMES MELLOR, DAVID LLEWELYN, THOMAS MOODY-STUART, DAVID 
KEELING & IONA BERKELEY, KERLY’S LAW OF TRADE MARKS AND TRADE NAMES, ¶¶ 18-101–
05, at 617–20 (15th ed. 2011). 
The prevalence of the use of “confusion” rather than “deception” maybe 
caused by a certain squeamishness on the part of claimants and judges 
to brand defendants as responsible for deception when there is no 
deliberate intent to deceive.  “Deception” should not be seen as a term 
of opprobrium, except in cases of fraud. 
Id. at 617 n.238 (emphasis added). 
27 Case C-206/01, Arsenal Football Club plc v. Reed, 2002 E.C.R. I-10299. 
28 Id. at I-10318, ¶ 56. 
29 Id. at I-10318, ¶ 57. 
30 Council Regulation 207/2009, art. 9(1)(b), 2009 O.J. (L 78/5) (EC).  Article 9(1)(b) 
expresses likelihood of confusion as 
any sign where, because of its identity with, or similarity to, the 
Community trade mark and the identity or similarity of the goods or 
services covered by the Community trade mark and the sign, there 
exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public; the likelihood of 
confusion includes the likelihood of association between the sign and the 
trade mark[.] 
Id. (emphasis added). 
31 See, e.g., id. at art. 1(2) (explaining that an applicant must submit a single application to 
the OHIM and, if successful, will be granted a single trademark for the entire EU). 
32 See supra notes 30–32 and accompanying text (explaining the applicability of the 
CTMR and TMD). 
33 See supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text (asserting that the CTMR is very similar 
to the TMD, which applies to member states of the EU). 
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confusion, this Article next discusses the effect that trademark confusion 
has on consumers. 
A. Locating the Confused 
Consumers are complex creatures with diverse behaviors.34  There 
are several different types of consumers:  those who are affluent, middle 
income, and lower income.35  Furthermore, because of the complexity of 
consumers, their needs vary from luxury goods to knock-offs.36  The 
CJEU has described consumers as “reasonably well-informed and 
reasonably observant and circumspect”; thus, in light of this observation, 
it is hard to imagine how post-sale confusion can occur among 
consumers.37  But consumer confusion does occur even among the 
observant and circumspect consumers, and oftentimes even the most 
sophisticated consumers are confused as to the origin of their goods and 
services.38  Because consumers are the ultimate users of trademarked 
goods and services, confusion can occur at any stage of the transaction, 
including pre-sale (initial interest), point of sale, and post-sale 
confusion.39 
Determining confusion at any stage is not only difficult, but it also 
depends on the rational behavioral shopping pattern of the consumers.40  
For example, a regular user of TIDE detergents may not opt to purchase 
a rival detergent under the brand RIDE, because the regular consumer 
knows that RIDE does not equate to the quality of TIDE detergents, nor 
does it indicate that RIDE was manufactured by Tide Corporation.  RIDE 
detergents simply did not originate in Tide Corporation.  However, 
                                                 
34 Lars Perner, Consumer Behavior:  The Psychology of Marketing, UNIV. S. CAL., 
http://www.consumerpsychologist.com/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2012). 
35 See generally Stuart U. Rich & Subhash C. Jain, Social Class and Life Cycle as Predictors of 
Shopping Behavior, J. MARKETING RES. 41 (1968). 
36 See Michael J. Madison, Trademark Law-Fall 2010:  Consumers and Knockoffs, 
MADISONIAN (Sept. 2010), http://madisonian.net/home/?p=752 (“While shoppers are 
happy with the price [of knock-offs], there are often nagging doubts about the items’ 
quality, their legality and who ends up profiting.”). 
37 Case C-342/97, Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer & Co. GmbH v. Klijsen Handel BV, 1999 
E.C.R. I-3830, I-3841; see Hermès Int’l v. Lederer De Paris Fifth Ave., Inc., 219 F.3d 104, 107 
(2d Cir. 2000) (holding that the defendant “encourage[d] consumer confusion in the post-
sale context” by selling knock-offs of the claimant’s luxurious handbags). 
38 See TMD, supra note 3, at recital 11 (stating that the function of a registered trademark 
is to “guarantee the trade mark as an indication of origin”). 
39 Jeremy N Sheff, Veblen Brands, 96 MINN. L. REV. 769, 776–77 (2012) (explaining how 
the idea of point of sale confusion has dramatically expanded with the creation of doctrines 
like post-sale confusion).  See generally Jennifer E. Rothman, Initial Interest Confusion:  
Standing at the Crossroads of Trademark Law, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 105, 160–61 (2005). 
40 See supra notes 34–39 and accompanying text (discussing consumer trends and their 
effects on shopping behavior). 
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another consumer strolls into the supermarket, notices that RIDE 
detergents are packed next to TIDE detergents, and decides to purchase 
RIDE, not necessarily knowing that RIDE is not a product of Tide 
Corporation.  Nonetheless, Tide Corporation’s excellent reputation for 
making detergent has developed over time.  Therefore, a regular shopper 
with a consistent rational behavioral pattern of shopping may not 
necessarily be confused, but the irregular shopper who purchased the 
rival RIDE detergent may be confused as to the origin of source.  Thus, 
confusion can be a “mental state” affecting irregular shoppers, but it 
should not influence the consistent rational behavioral pattern of regular 
shoppers.41   
In Och-Ziff, the court held that there was an infringement of the 
senior mark, Och-Ziff, and that “a confusing advertisement may affect 
the reputation of the trade marked goods or services.”42  Further, the 
court found that “confusion may erode the distinctiveness of the trade 
mark.”43  Trademark is not merely a word, but it can also include sound 
marks; thus, the court found that an infringement existed between the 
more established Och-Ziff and the junior mark Och Capital, because 
there was not a notable difference between the sound of the two marks 
in an electronic advertisement, particularly when relating to financial 
products.44  The use of the prefix Och in relation to financial services 
could easily confuse consumers as to the advertised goods’ source of 
origin.  To determine likelihood of confusion in European law, the TMD 
and CTMR provide a list of factors, which will be examined in more 
detail below.45 
                                                 
41 ILANAH SIMON FHIMA, TRADE MARK DILUTION IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 
para. 3.107, at 100 (2011) (explaining that confusion is both a mental state and a form of 
harm); see Edward S. Rogers, The Unwary Purchaser:  A Study in the Psychology of Trade Mark 
Infringement, 8 MICH. L. REV. 613, 614–15 (1910) (stating that the unwary shopper is not 
likely to make comparisons when purchasing goods or services).  Specifically, Rogers 
makes the following observation: 
[The unwary shopper] is not bound to make comparisons between 
labels or brands and has usually no opportunity to do so.  He is likely 
in making his purchase to act on the moment and is not bound to 
study or reflect, to analyze labels or packages, or to read and examine 
them.  He is not bound to remember more than the general features of 
a mark, brand or label and is not expected to have in mind the details. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
42 Och-Ziff Mgmt. Eur. Ltd. v. Och Capital LLP, [2010] EWHC (Ch) 2599, [101]. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. [101]–[02] 
45 See infra notes 46–51 and accompanying text (providing the various factors courts will 
consider in a likelihood of confusion analysis). 
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B. The Determinants of Likelihood of Confusion in EU Trademark Law 
The factors for determining the likelihood of confusion in EU 
trademark law are set out in Article 5(1)(b) of the TMD, the 
corresponding Article of the CTMR, Article 9(1)(b), and European case 
law.46  The EU factors for determining likelihood of confusion sometimes 
                                                 
46 The U.K. Trademark Registry has developed a set of key principles based on the case 
law that are necessary when determining likelihood of confusion.  These principles were 
cited in Specsavers Int’l Healthcare Ltd. v. Asda Stores Ltd. in the English High Court, where 
Asda was found to have infringed Specsavers’ trademarks.  See Case A3/2010/2581, 
Specsavers Int’l Healthcare Ltd. v. Asda Stores Ltd., [2012] EWCA (Civ) 24, [52].  The 
principles include the following considerations: 
(a) the likelihood of confusion must be appreciated globally, taking 
account of all relevant factors; 
(b) the matter must be judged through the eyes of the average 
consumer of the goods or services in question, who is deemed to be 
reasonably well informed and reasonably circumspect and observant, 
but who rarely has the chance to make direct comparisons between 
marks and must instead rely upon the imperfect picture of them he has 
kept in his mind, and whose attention varies according to the category 
of goods or services in question; 
(c) the average consumer normally perceives a mark as a whole and 
does not proceed to analyse its various details; 
(d) the visual, aural and conceptual similarities of the marks must 
normally be assessed by reference to the overall impressions created 
by the marks bearing in mind their distinctive and dominant 
components, but it is only when all other components of a complex 
mark are negligible that it is permissible to make the comparison solely 
on the basis of the dominant elements; 
(e) nevertheless, the overall impression conveyed to the public by a 
composite trade mark may, in certain circumstances, be dominated by 
one or more of its components; 
(f) and beyond the usual case, where the overall impression created by 
a mark depends heavily on the dominant features of the mark, it is 
quite possible that in a particular case an element corresponding to an 
earlier trade mark may retain an independent distinctive role in a 
composite mark, without necessarily constituting a dominant element 
of that mark; 
(g) a lesser degree of similarity between the goods or services may be 
offset by a greater degree of similarity between the marks, and vice 
versa; 
(h) there is a greater likelihood of confusion where the earlier mark has 
a highly distinctive character, either per se or because of the use that 
has been made of it; 
(i) mere association, in the strict sense that the later mark brings the 
earlier mark to mind, is not sufficient; 
(j) the reputation of a mark does not give grounds for presuming a 
likelihood of confusion simply because of a likelihood of association in 
the strict sense; 
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hinge on the global appreciation factor.47  Other times, courts may 
invoke two or more of the Polaroid factors.48  The Polaroid factors were set 
out by Judge Friendly to help resolve the issue of likelihood of confusion 
and include:  (1) strength of the mark; (2) degree of similarity of the 
marks; (3) proximity of the products (whether the market segments 
overlap); (4) bridging the gap (whether the trademark owner intended to 
enter the infringer’s market); (5) actual confusion; (6) infringer’s good 
faith or lack thereof; (7) quality of respective goods; and (8) 
sophistication of relevant buyers.49  Several cases in the CJEU have 
utilized similar factors, albeit fewer than the eight used in Polaroid, with 
global appreciation emerging as the probable champion for the 
likelihood of confusion test.50 
The legal provisions of the likelihood of confusion doctrine are set 
out in Article 5(1)(a) and (b) of the TMD, which states that the following 
rights are conferred by a trademark: 
1. The registered trade mark shall confer on the 
proprietor exclusive rights therein.  The proprietor shall 
be entitled to prevent all third parties not having his 
consent from using in the course of trade: 
 
(a) any sign which is identical with the trade mark in 
relation to goods or services which are identical with 
those for which the trade mark is registered; 
 
(b) any sign where, because of its identity with, or 
similarity to, the trade mark and the identity or 
similarity of the goods or services covered by the trade 
mark and the sign, there exists a likelihood of confusion 
on the part of the public; the likelihood of confusion 
                                                                                                             
(k) if the association between the marks causes the public to wrongly 
believe that the respective goods [or services] come from the same or 
economically-linked undertakings, there is a likelihood of confusion. 
Id.  See generally id. [51]–[117] (explaining the overall general approach for likelihood of 
confusion); TMD, supra note 3 (developing the principals of the likelihood of confusion 
under TMD); Council Regulation 207/2009, art. 9(1)(b), 2009 O.J. (L 78/5) (EC) 
(summarizing the application of trademarks). 
47 See infra Part II.B.2 (analyzing the idea of global appreciation in post-sale confusion). 
48 See infra note 49 (listing the Polaroid factors). 
49 Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elects. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961); see Tichane, 
supra note 9, at 409–10 (explaining the post-sales confusion doctrine). 
50 See Part II.B (discussing the likelihood of confusion tests in the United States and 
Europe). 
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includes the likelihood of association between the sign 
and the trade mark.51 
There are two observations that need to be made about Article 5(1) of 
the TMD.  First, the definition for trademark infringement—likelihood of 
confusion—is enshrined.  Second, the definition is overly broad and 
leaves room for the development of multiple forms of confusion.  Post-
sale confusion is no exception.  Even with a stretch of the imagination, 
one could argue that the courts will likely develop a sort of curious 
confusion, which occurs when a sign suggests to the consuming public 
that the junior mark belongs to the various senior marks that a 
conglomerate owns. 
Commentators have pointed out that when the provisions of Article 
5(1)(a) and (b) are closely examined, there is virtually no difference in the 
provisions.52  This Article submits that this is true.  There is hardly any 
difference between the two provisions, except that Article 5(1)(a) 
emphasizes “identity” and Article 5(1)(b) then incorporates that identity 
into “similarity” to determine likelihood of confusion.53  Nevertheless, as 
the courts have reiterated, Article 5(1)(a) relates to the origin function.54  
But, more importantly, for an infringement to occur under Article 5(1)(a), 
an identical sign must be used.55  Contrast this with Article 5(1)(b), which 
helps judges determine whether an identical sign causes a likelihood of 
confusion.56 
Article 5(1)(b) becomes the main provision for which to frame the 
question:  What are the criterion or determinants for assessing the 
likelihood of confusion within the meaning of that provision?  Based on 
legal provisions, the key ingredient in determining likelihood of 
confusion in EU trademark infringement cases is the degree of the 
similarity of the goods or services, including factors such as global 
appreciation.57  In Canon v. MGM, the CJEU explained that the distinctive 
character and reputation must be taken into account “when determining 
whether the similarity between the goods or services” covered by the 
senior and junior marks “is sufficient to give rise to the likelihood of 
                                                 
51 TMD, supra note 3, at art. 5(1)(a)–(b). 
52 See Duncan Ribbons, What’s the Difference Between Article 5(1)(a) and 5(1)(b)? Not a 
lot . . ., 6 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 435, 435–36 (2011) (explaining that in European 
trademark law, the only difference between these two provisions of Article 5 of the TMD is 
who bears the burden of proof). 
53 TMD, supra note 3, at art. 5(1)(a). 
54 See infra Part III.B (examining five cases that have interpreted Article 5(1)(b)).  
55 E.g., Case C-17/06, Céline SARL v. Céline SA, 2007 E.C.R. I-7060, I-7068. 
56 See TMD, supra note 3, at art. 5(1)(b). 
57 See infra Part II.B.1 (exploring the difference between identity and similarity in 
European trademark jurisprudence). 
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confusion.”58  Canon was only one of the many CJEU cases that shaped 
how the likelihood of confusion evolved within European trademark law 
jurisprudence.59   
But despite the plethora of case law on likelihood of confusion, it still 
suffers from a prairie syndrome, which means that likelihood of 
confusion is a vast and indeterminate field in which other patches or 
factors would need to be identified in order to determine the full extent 
of likelihood of confusion in trademark infringement cases.  There are 
two questions that need to be raised when assessing likelihood of 
confusion:  (1) What does the court mean by “global appreciation” and 
(2) when are signs confusingly similar?60  Before addressing these 
questions, some more needs to be said regarding the broader notion of 
likelihood of confusion. 
The General Court (“GC”) should not be overlooked when 
discussing the likelihood of confusion, because it helped shape how 
likelihood of confusion has been interpreted, even though its decisions 
are often in line with previous decisions of the CJEU.61  For example, in 
Hipp & Co. KG v. OHIM, the GC confirmed that the likelihood of 
confusion must be assessed globally.62  But one of the most in-depth GC 
discussions on the likelihood of confusion was by Advocate General 
Jacobs in Sabel, where he discussed the broad and narrow aspects of 
confusion, as well as “the economic link” in determining confusion.63  
Furthermore, as the Advocate General would later argue, “All the 
Directive requires is that there be a likelihood of confusion as a result of 
the similarity of the marks.”64  In determining the likelihood of 
confusion, the degree of similarity and the global appreciation of the 
                                                 
58 Case C-39/97, Canon Kabushiki Kaisha v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 1998 E.C.R. I-
5525, I-5534. 
59 See generally cases cited supra note 7 (demonstrating the evolution of European 
trademark law). 
60 E.g., Case C-342/97, Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer & Co. GmbH v. Klijsen Handel BV, 
1999 E.C.R. I-3830, I-3841. 
61 See Case T-157/10, Barilla G. e R. Fratelli SpA v. OHIM, 2012 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 
¶ 11 (Mar. 23, 2012) (recognizing the likelihood of confusion doctrine); Case T-288/08, 
Cadila Healthcare Ltd. v. OHIM, 2012 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS ¶ 66 (Mar. 15, 2012) 
(discussing an overall assessment of the likelihood of confusion). 
62 Case T-41/09, Hipp & Co. KG v. OHIM, 2012 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS ¶ 21 (Mar. 28, 
2012) (“[T]he likelihood of confusion must be assessed globally, according to the relevant 
public’s perception of the signs and the goods or services concerned and account being 
taken of all factors relevant to the circumstances of the case . . . .”). 
63 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Case C-251/95, Sabel v. Puma, 1997 E.C.R. I-
6193, I-6204. 
64 Id. at I-6212. 
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mark are well-established in European trademark jurisprudence 
interpreting the TMD.65 
Despite the GC’s role in shaping the interpretation of likelihood of 
confusion, the GC and the CJEU are often at odds in their application of 
the factors for determining likelihood of confusion.  When the former 
wife of tennis star Boris Becker attempted to register her married name, 
Becker, the GC and the CJEU sent conflicting signals regarding the 
likelihood of confusion.  In Becker v. Harman International Industries, Inc., 
there were notable differences between the two courts regarding the 
likelihood of confusion.66 
In Becker, the ex-wife of the German tennis player applied for a CTM 
to register the word mark BARBARA BECKER under Class 9 of the Nice 
Agreement.67  The application was opposed by Harman, because 
BECKER ONLINE PRO was already registered and covered goods 
falling within Class 9 of the Nice Agreement.68  The opposition division 
of the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (“OHIM”) found 
that there was a likelihood of confusion; however, the First Board of 
Appeal of the OHIM annulled that decision.69  Harman appealed that 
decision to the GC, which held that there was a likelihood of confusion 
between the junior mark and the senior mark.70  The decision of the GC 
was then appealed at the CJEU.71  In its review, the CJEU chastised the 
GC for failing to consider “all the relevant factors specific to the case, in 
disregard of the requirement of an overall assessment of the likelihood of 
confusion . . . .”72 
In its decision, the GC argued that “the earlier word mark BECKER 
and the trade mark applied for Barbara Becker are in conflict.”73  
According to the GC, “[T]he overall impression produced by those 
marks leads to the finding that they have a certain similarity visually and 
phonetically on account of their common component . . . .”74  The GC 
                                                 
65 Case C-552/09 P, Ferrero SpA v. OHIM, 2011 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS ¶ 99 (Mar. 24, 
2011) (“[I]t is only if there is some similarity between the marks at issue that the General 
Court must take into account, in the global assessment of a likelihood of confusion or of a 
link being made between those marks . . . .”). 
66 Case C-51/09 P, Becker v. Harman Int’l Indus., Inc., 2010 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 
(June 24, 2010). 
67 Id. ¶¶ 4–5. 
68 Id. ¶ 6. 
69 Id. ¶ 8. 
70 Id. ¶¶ 31–34. 
71 Id. ¶¶ 11–18. 
72 Id. ¶ 40. 
73 Case T-212/07, Harman Int’l Indus. v. OHIM, 2008 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS ¶ 31 (Dec. 
2, 2008). 
74 Id. ¶ 33. 
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further explained that the Board of Appeal’s “assessment of the relative 
importance of the component ‘becker’ compared to the component 
‘barbara’, in the mark Barbara Becker, cannot be upheld.”75  
Furthermore, the GC explained that “consumers generally attribute 
greater distinctiveness to the surname than to the forename contained in 
trade marks.”76  After further discussion on the nature of earlier CTM 
BECKER and Barbara Becker, the GC noted that “[t]hey are thus 
similar,”77 and then held that “assessing globally the marks at issue and 
comparing them visually, phonetically and conceptually, the conflicting 
marks must be held to be similar.”78 
The CJEU reiterated that the global appreciation factor must be taken 
into account in order to find likelihood of confusion.79 Although it is 
possible in parts of the EU for surnames to have “a more distinctive 
character than forenames,” it was appropriate to take into account all the 
factors specific to the case.80  According to the CJEU, the GC decision in 
Becker “erred in law in basing its assessment of the conceptual similarity 
of the marks on general considerations taken from the case-law.”81 
In this instance, the GC determined that the signs Barbara Becker 
and Becker were confusingly similar; however, the CJEU disagreed, 
explaining that the GC failed to consider all the relevant factors for 
likelihood of confusion, and remanded the case back to the GC.82  The 
CJEU reiterated the need for a case-by-case analysis to determine the 
likelihood of confusion.83  This case portrays the different approaches 
that both courts have utilized in determining the likelihood of confusion.  
                                                 
75 Id. ¶ 34. 
76 Id. ¶ 35 (citing Case T-185/03, Fusco v. OHIM, 2005 E.C.R. II-715, ¶ 54). 
77 Id. ¶ 36.  “[T]he component ‘becker’ will be perceived as a surname, which is 
commonly used to describe a person.”  Id. ¶ 37. 
78 Id. ¶ 38. 
79 Case C-51/09 P, Becker v. OHIM, 2010 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS ¶ 32 (June 24, 2010). 
80 Id. ¶ 36.  This was a similar argument made by Advocate General Cruz Villalón in his 
opinion that was delivered on March 25, 2010.  See generally Opinion of Advocate General 
Cruz Villalón, Case C-51/09 P, Becker, 2010 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS (Mar. 25, 2010). 
81 Becker v. OHIM, 2010 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS ¶ 40.  The paragraph reads in full: 
It follows from all the foregoing that the General Court erred in law in 
basing its assessment of the conceptual similarity of the marks on 
general considerations taken from the case-law without analysing all 
the relevant factors specific to the case, in disregard of the requirement 
of an overall assessment of the likelihood of confusion, taking account 
of all factors relevant to the circumstances of the case, and based on the 
overall impression produced by the marks at issue. 
Id. 
82 Id. ¶¶ 40–42. 
83 Id. ¶ 40. 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 47, No. 1 [2012], Art. 1
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol47/iss1/1
2012] Post-Sale Confusion Exists in Europe 15 
In addition to these difficulties, additional obstacles arise when trying to 
define identity and similarity. 
1. The Identity/Similarity Disparity 
In order to examine the similarity of the marks and likelihood of 
confusion infringement, this Article addresses what the TMD and CTMR 
say about identity and similarity.  The use of the two terms creates a 
singular line of reasoning because the words are almost synonymous.  So 
how does one differentiate the terms in determining the likelihood of 
confusion?  At one point Advocate General Jacobs suggested that the 
distinction between identity and similarity does not affect the outcome of 
litigation based on the likelihood of confusion.84  The GC also argued 
that “the identity or similarity between two signs” is to be examined 
based on their “visual, phonetic and conceptual similarity.”85  The 
identity of the marks is a factor that must be addressed when making a 
determination on the likelihood of confusion. 
a. Identity of Marks 
In LTJ Diffusion SA v. Sadas Vertbaudet SA, the court explained that 
“the essential function of a trade mark is to guarantee the identity of 
origin of the marked goods or services.”86  Based on the reasoning of 
European trademark case law, the meaning of identity is to ensure that 
goods have a traceable origin.87  Thus, a good is an object and it should 
have an identifiable origin that is served by a trademark.  Identity is used 
to ensure or indicate origin, since the word identity is used almost in 
                                                 
84 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Case C-291/00, LTJ Diffusion SA v. Sadas 
Vertbaudet SA, 2002 E.C.R. I-2802, I-2807, ¶ 20.  Advocate Jacobs stated: 
[T]he Court’s ruling will affect nether the right to prohibit use of an 
identical sign where goods or services are not identical but only similar 
nor the possibility of refusal or invalidation of registration in the same 
circumstances (Articles 4(1)(b) and 5(1)(b) of the Directive).  In such 
cases, in which a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public must 
be established, it is not decisive whether the mark and sign, or the two 
marks, are themselves identical rather than similar, so that the precise 
contours of the distinction between identity and similarity will not 
affect the outcome. 
Id. 
85 Case T-227/09, Feng Shen Tech. Co. v. OHIM, 2012 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS ¶ 39 (Mar. 
21, 2012). 
86 Case C-291/00, LTJ Diffusion SA v. Sadas Vertbaudet SA, 2003 E.C.R. I-2816, I-2831. 
87 Id. 
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conjunction with similarity in the context of a trademark.88  But the word 
identity also presents a problem when determining whether goods 
should be considered identical.  Apparently, goods are identical when 
the goods are similar.  This, of course, means very little because the 
distinction between identity and similarity is still troublesome.  The 
CJEU has not addressed this troublesome issue with precision.  Advocate 
General Jacobs attempted to define identical in the context of trademark 
law:  “The concept of identity between mark and sign . . . covers identical 
reproduction without any addition, omission or modification other than 
those which are either minute or wholly insignificant.”89 
Advocate General Jacobs’s construction of the meaning of “identical” 
was in line with a strict interpretation of the term, which was favored by 
most of the parties in LTJ Diffusion SA.90  A dictionary definition, 
however, was not necessarily in the cards.91  For example, Webster’s 
Collegiate Dictionary defines identical as “having such close resemblance 
as to be essentially the same,” or “being the same; selfsame.”92  Such a 
definition would have been too loose and, thus, a strict interpretation of 
identical was “consistent with the scheme, history and context” of the 
provisions in the TMD.93  The CJEU also favored a strict interpretation of 
the term identical: 
The criterion of identity of the sign and the trade mark 
must be interpreted strictly.  The very definition of 
identity implies that the two elements compared should 
be the same in all respects.  Indeed, the absolute 
protection in the case of a sign which is identical with 
the trade mark in relation to goods or services which are 
identical with those for which the trade mark is 
registered, which is guaranteed by Article 5(1)(a) of the 
                                                 
88 See Susie Middlemiss & Carina Badger, Nipping Taste Marks in the Bud, 26 EUR. INTELL. 
PROP. REV. 152, 153 (2004) (“The essential function of a trade mark is to guarantee the 
identity of the origin of the marked product or service . . . .”). 
89 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, supra note 84, at I-2815.  The Advocate General 
had previously defined the word identical to mean, “Where in the light of such an 
assessment any differences are minute and wholly insignificant, so that the average 
consumer would not find any noticeable difference between the two . . . .”  Id. at I-2813. 
90 Id. at I-2809. 
91 Id. 
92 MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 616 (11th ed. 2004). 
93 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, supra note 84, at I-2809.  Advocate General 
Jacobs stated, “Articles 4(1)(a) and 5(1)(a) of the Directive confer unconditional rights on 
trade-mark proprietors where the relevant elements are all identical; Articles 4(1)(b) and 
5(1(b) confer rights dependent on the existence of a likelihood of confusion where some 
elements are merely similar.”  Id. at I-2810. 
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directive, cannot be extended beyond the situations for 
which it was envisaged, in particular, to those situations 
which are more specifically protected by Article 5(1)(b) 
of the directive.94 
The meaning of “identical,” in determining the likelihood of confusion in 
European trademark law, cannot be read apart from the adjective 
“similar” or its noun “similarity” as outlined in Article 5(1) of the TMD.  
This grammatical detour only highlights how the factors for determining 
likelihood of confusion are intertwined and how any misapplication of 
one factor can jeopardize the outcome of trademark infringement 
litigation.  The next component in the likelihood of confusion analysis is 
determining whether the signs or goods are similar. 
b. The Similarities Comparison 
Recall John Doe from the introduction of this Article.  John Doe and 
his common law wife Mary Jane are average consumers.  He goes to the 
high street supermarket to get his weekly or monthly supply of goods.  
While at the supermarket, he picks up his regular six-pack, but he notices 
something odd or simply conveniently placed.  Next to his six-pack are 
chips with labels that look similar to that of his six-pack.  Assuming the 
chips were also a complement to the beer and made by the same 
conglomerate, he happily decides to munch on the chips while enjoying 
the lager.  Apply the same story to Mary Jane, a shoe lover, who finds a 
similar brand of shoes lying next to her beloved brand while shopping. 
The courts reinforce the idea that consumers can also be confused 
due to the similarity of signs; therefore, the visual, aural or phonetics, 
and conceptual similarities—the holy trinity—must be considered to 
determine likelihood of confusion.95  In Tsakiris-Mallas AE v. OHIM, the 
main contention was whether the public, people like Mary Jane and John 
Doe, could have been confused about the origin of the branded shoes 
with the sign SEVEN and the figurative sign SEVEN FASHION 
SHOES.96  The GC observed that the “relevant public,” including John 
Doe and Mary Jane, will be “likely to confuse the origin of the goods 
covered by the marks at issue.”97  The rationale for this reasoning, the 
                                                 
94 Case C-291/00, LTJ Diffusion SA v. Sadas Vertbaudet SA, 2003 E.C.R. I-2816, I-2833; 
see id. at I-2828, I-2830–34 (interpreting Articles 4, 5(1)(b), and 16 in the context of the issue 
before the court). 
95 Case T-244/10, Tsakiris-Mallas AE v. OHIM, 2012 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS ¶ 37 (May 
8, 2012). 
96 Id. ¶¶ 2, 6. 
97 Id. ¶ 60. 
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GC explained, was that the goods covered by the mark were identical 
and involved the holy trinity comparison of similarities, whereas the 
marks are visually, phonetically, and conceptually similar.98 
This holy trinity of similarities forms one step in the courts’ attempt 
to determine likelihood of confusion.99  In Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer & Co. 
GmbH v. Klijsen Handel BV, the court explained that in order to assess the 
degree of similarity between marks, “the degree of visual, aural or 
conceptual similarity” must be taken into account.100  The court also 
evaluated the importance attached to those different elements, in 
particular, how those elements relate to the category of goods and how 
they are being marketed.101  The Lloyd requirement of the similarity of 
the marks for determining likelihood of confusion was captured in the 
following statement:  “[F]or the purposes of Article 5(1)(b) of the [TMD], 
there may be a likelihood of confusion, notwithstanding a lesser degree 
of similarity between the trade marks, where the goods or services 
covered by them are very similar and the earlier mark is highly 
distinctive.”102 
This message has been applied to a number of CJEU decisions, such 
as Matratzen Concord GmbH v. OHIM, which indicates how the highly 
distinctive nature of the mark will play a role in the assessment of the 
global appreciation criteria for determining likelihood of confusion.103  In 
opposition proceedings, the OHIM Manual of Procedures instructs that (1) 
“[i]n the similarity-of-signs analysis the resemblances of the signs are 
analysed on an objective basis,” and (2) “[t]he examiner must consider 
                                                 
98 Id. 
99 There is either a hierarchical system in determining likelihood of confusion, or the 
courts are literally confused regarding the factors for determining likelihood of confusion.  
See Case T-424/10, Dosenbach-Ochsner AG Schuhe und Sport v. OHIM, 2012 EUR-Lex 
CELEX LEXIS ¶ 18 (Feb. 7, 2012) (noting the arguments developed by the CJEU over a 
period of time).  Specifically, the CJEU notes: 
[T]he risk that the public might believe that the goods or 
services . . . come from the same undertaking or from economically-
linked undertakings constitutes a likelihood of confusion. . . . [T]he 
likelihood of confusion must be assessed globally, according to the 
relevant public’s perception of the signs and goods or services 
concerned and taking into account all factors relevant to the 
circumstances of the case, in particular the interdependence between 
the similarity of the signs and that of the goods or services designated. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
100 Case C-342/97, Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer & Co. GmbH v. Klijsen Handel BV, 1999 
E.C.R. I-3830, I-3841.  
101 Id. at I-3841–42. 
102 Id. at I-3840 (parenthetical omitted).  “[A] lesser degree of similarity between those 
goods or services may be offset by a greater degree of similarity between the marks, and 
vice versa.”  Id. at I-3839. 
103 Case C-3/03 P, Matratzen Concord GmbH v. OHIM, 2004 E.C.R. I-3660. 
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the marketplace realities that characterise the relationship of the 
goods . . . [which will] play an important role in the global assessment of 
likelihood of confusion.”104 
Courts will look at three aspects of similarity when analyzing these 
cases:  (1) visual similarity, (2) conceptual similarity, and (3) aural 
similarity.105  For example, in Hell Energy Magyarország kft v. OHIM, the 
GC found that there was a sufficient degree of visual similarity between 
the marks that contributed to the likelihood of confusion, and the GC 
upheld the original ruling of the Board of Appeal.106  At issue in this case 
was the figurative sign HELL, which was designated for non-alcoholic 
drinks and energy drinks/beverages.107  The proprietor of the senior 
mark HELLA opposed the application, because the senior mark was 
designated for similar goods, including non-alcoholic drinks.108  
According to the GC, “[T]he visual similarity between the marks” could 
“give rise to a likelihood of confusion.”109 
                                                 
104 OHIM—THE MANUAL CONCERNING OPPOSITION—PART 2 CHAPTER 2A, 16, available at 
http://oami.europa.eu/ows/rw/resource/documents/CTM/legalReferences/partc_gene
ralremarks.pdf. 
105 See supra notes 98–101 (illustrating the application of these three factors). 
106 Case T-522/10, Hell Energy Magyarország kft v. OHIM, 2012 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 
¶¶ 50, 66–70 (Jan. 17, 2012).  The GC explained its findings this way: 
It is necessary to reject the argument that the Board of Appeal erred in 
finding that there was a likelihood of confusion on the ground that it 
did not take into consideration the differences between the consumers 
and between the goods covered by the marks at issue, bearing in mind 
that the ‘energy drinks’ covered by the mark applied for are included 
in the non-alcoholic drinks for which the earlier mark is registered and 
which are not confined to a category of the relevant public, an 
intended purpose or a given distribution method. 
Id. ¶ 68.  Also note the court’s reasoning in Tsakiris-Mallas, where the court found that the 
signs “were visually similar.”  Case T-244/10, Tsakiris-Mallas AE v. OHIM, 2012 EUR-Lex 
CELEX LEXIS ¶ 50 (May 8, 2012). 
107 Hell Energy, 2012 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS, ¶¶ 2–3. 
108 Id. ¶¶ 5–6. 
109 Id. ¶ 69.  The GC made the following remarks concerning visual similarities: 
In the light of the great visual similarity of the words constituting the 
signs at issue, the earlier mark being a word mark which may, like the 
mark applied for, be written in upper case letters, and of the little 
impact which the colours and stylisation of the mark applied for are 
likely to have on the relevant public, the Board of Appeal was right 
that there is visual similarity. 
Id. ¶ 50 (emphasis added).  But see Case T-417/09, Poslovni Sistem Mercator d.d. v. OHIM, 
2012 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS ¶ 32 (Mar. 29, 2012) (finding no likelihood of confusion 
concerning the word sign MERCATOR STUDIOS (junior mark) and the figurative mark 
MERCATOR (senior mark)). 
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On multiple occasions, the CJEU has considered a mark’s conceptual 
similarity,110 asking whether the similarity has created the likelihood of 
confusion.111  In Medion AG v. Thomson Sales Germany & Austria GmbH, 
the CJEU explained that the perception of the marks gained by 
consumers due to its conceptual similarity “plays a decisive role” in 
determining likelihood of confusion.112  In Calvin Klein Trademark Trust v. 
OHIM, a dispute arose over a CK symbol, because the junior mark CK 
CREACIONES KENNYA sought registration for clothing.113  The 
proprietor of the senior mark, CALVIN KLEIN, objected to the 
registration, and the GC held that there was a “lack of similarity between 
the signs,” which was a result of “visual, phonetic and conceptual 
differences.”114  On appeal, the CJEU confirmed that there was no 
                                                 
110 In Tsakiris-Mallas, the court found that consumers would recognize “that there was a 
conceptual link between the signs,” holding that they were conceptually similar.  Tsakiris-
Mallas AE, 2012 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS ¶¶ 56–57. 
111 See Case C-57/08 P, Gateway, Inc., v. OHIM, 2008 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS ¶ 48 (Dec. 
11, 2008) (“[A]ppreciation of the likelihood of confusion, in relation to . . . conceptual 
similarity of the marks . . . must be based on the overall impression given by the 
marks . . . .”); see also Tsakiris-Mallas AE, 2012 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS ¶¶ 10, 37, 55–57 
(explaining how the signs at issue were conceptually similar); Case T-32/10, Ella Valley 
Vineyards (Adulam), Ltd. v. OHIM, 2012 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS ¶¶ 38, 49 (Mar. 9, 2012) 
(discussing conceptual similarity in relation to the marks at issue); Case T-260/08, Indo 
Int’l, SA v. OHIM, 2012 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS ¶ 39 (Jan. 24, 2012) (explaining how a 
“close conceptual similarity between the signs” existed); Case C-552/09 P, Ferrero SpA v. 
OHIM, 2011 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS ¶ 85 (Mar. 24, 2011) (discussing the importance of 
considering conceptual similarity). 
112 Case C-120/04, Medion AG v. Thomson Multimedia Sales Ger. & Austria GmbH, 2005 
E.C.R. I-8565, I-8573; see also Case C-171/06 P, T.I.M.E. ART Uluslararasi Saat Ticareti ve dis 
Ticaret AS v. OHIM, 2007 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS ¶ 33 (Mar. 15, 2007)  (“The existence of a 
likelihood of confusion on the part of the public must therefore be appreciated 
globally . . . .”); Case T-292/01, Philips-Van Heusen Corp. v. OHIM, 2003 E.C.R. II-4338, II-
4358 (explaining that likelihood of confusion is “based on the overall impression given by 
the marks”). 
113 Case T-185/07, Calvin Klein Trademark Trust v. OHIM, 2009 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 
¶¶ 1–3 (May 7, 2009). 
114 Id. ¶ 52.  In full, the court offered the following analysis: 
Conceptually, the Board of Appeal did not err in finding that the 
words “creaciones kennya”, from which the group of letters “ck” is 
derived, create a conceptual difference compared with the earlier 
marks. . . . [A]lthough the group of letters “ck” in the mark applied for 
derives from the words “creaciones kennya”, the group of letters “ck” 
of which the earlier marks consist constitutes a reference to the well-
known manufacturer and designer of fashion items Calvin Klein. 
 
It is apparent from the foregoing that the Board of Appeal did not err 
when it found that the marks at issue are not similar.  The visual, 
phonetic and conceptual examination of the marks shows that the 
overall impression created by the earlier marks is dominated by the 
sole or dominant element “ck” whereas that created by the trade mark 
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likelihood of confusion between the marks.115  The CJEU upheld the GC’s 
decision, explaining that the owner of the senior mark failed to produce 
evidence that the GC distorted the facts during its assessment.116  
Further, the CJEU noted that the GC conducted a detailed analysis of the 
junior mark, including the mark’s conceptual similarity.117  In the 
majority of the cases where both the GC and the CJEU discussed 
conceptual similarity, the findings were often in favor of the senior mark; 
however, in Calvin Klein, the junior mark triumphed despite challenging 
a well-known brand. 
The third aspect of similarity, linked to both visual and conceptual 
similarities, consists of aural similarities or phonetics.118  The courts have 
discussed phonetic similarities in most of the cases involving visual and 
conceptual similarities.119  On one occasion, the holy trinity was 
challenged over the appearance of elephants.120  In Dosenbach-Ochsner AG 
Schuhe und Sport v. OHIM, the proprietor of the senior mark challenged 
the OHIM’s Board of Appeal findings on all aspects of the trinity.121  The 
Board of Appeal had previously held that the marks were not 
phonetically similar because they were figurative and did not 
correspond to their oral description.122  Further, the Board of Appeal 
found that “there was conceptual similarity resulting from the reference 
to an elephant in each of the marks concerned.”123  The GC held that 
OHIM’s decision was “vitiated by errors in the assessment of phonetic 
similarity and conceptual similarity.”124  The GC analyzed the three 
aspects of the trinity methodologically, including the visual 
comparison,125 conceptual comparison,126 and phonetic comparison.127  
                                                                                                             
applied for is dominated by the element “creaciones kennya”.  The 
lack of similarity between the signs at issue thus stems from the visual, 
phonetic and conceptual differences . . . . 
Id. ¶¶ 51–52. 
115 Id. ¶ 58. 
116 Id. ¶ 51. 
117 Id. ¶ 55. 
118 See, e.g., Case T-244/10, Tsakiris-Mallas AE v. OHIM, 2012 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 
¶¶ 53–54 (May 8, 2012) (“[T]he presence of the words ‘fashion shoes’ does not rule out the 
phonetic similarity of the signs[,]” as such, the signs were “phonetically similar.”). 
119 See infra notes 123–44 and accompanying text (analyzing cases that have discussed 
phonetic similarity).  
120 Case T-424/10, Dosenbach-Ochsner AG Schuhe und Sport v. OHIM, 2012 EUR-Lex 
CELEX LEXIS (Feb. 7, 2012). 
121 Id. ¶¶ 7–12, 42–47 (comparing the phonetic similarities between the junior and senior 
marks). 
122 Id. ¶ 10. 
123 Id. ¶ 11. 
124 Id. ¶ 53. 
125 Id. ¶¶ 25–41. 
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When comparing the phonetics of each mark, the GC argued that the 
Board of Appeal’s reasoning was contradictory on the question of 
phonetic similarity.128  The GC found that it was not possible to conclude 
whether “there is either a phonetic similarity or a phonetic dissimilarity 
between [the junior] mark and the [senior] marks.”129 
The Dosenbach decision raised a few questions, including what the 
standard should be for finding aural or phonetic similarities in marks, 
specifically figurative marks.130  Perhaps the GC’s reasoning was sound 
in that there were essential errors in the Board of Appeal’s assessment, 
but the GC’s analysis did not make the issue any clearer.  This is 
significant, raising the question of how the trinity is handled within 
OHIM itself.  The proceeding discussion focuses on how the OHIM has 
handled the phonetic aspect of similarity, discussing three cases 
involving food, banking, and stationery.  These cases were randomly 
selected from the OHIM database and concern Board of Appeal 
decisions discussing OHIM analysis of phonetic similarity. 
In Premo B.V. v. Calzados Parker S.L., the dispute concerned the 
pronunciation of stationery labels and the controversy of the figurative 
signs PK, the junior mark, and PK CHE PAKER, the senior mark.131  The 
first two letters of the signs were the same with one notable difference:  
the senior mark contained additional words, CHE PAKER.132  In 
addition, CHE was hardly visible in the figurative sign, which consisted 
of a black square.133  The junior mark also consisted of a black square 
with a white background; however, it was debatable whether the second 
                                                                                                             
126 Id. ¶¶ 48–54. 
127 Id. ¶¶ 42–47. 
128 Id. ¶ 44. 
129 Id. ¶ 47.  The court stated that 
[a] figurative mark without word elements cannot, by definition, be 
pronounced.  At the very most, its visual or conceptual content can be 
described orally.  Such a description, however, necessarily coincides 
with either the visual perception or the conceptual perception of the 
mark in question.  Consequently, it is not necessary to examine 
separately the phonetic perception of a figurative mark lacking word 
elements and to compare it with the phonetic perception of other 
marks. 
Id. ¶ 46.  The court also added that “a phonetic comparison is not relevant in the 
examination of the similarity of a figurative mark without word elements with 
another mark.”  Id. ¶ 45. 
130 See supra notes 124–32 (discussing the Dosenbach case). 
131 Case R 121/2009-1, Premo B.V. v. Calzados Paker S.L., 2009 OHIM ¶ 1 (1st Bd. Appeal 
Oct. 23, 2009) (OHIM, EU case law). 
132 Id. ¶ 38. 
133 Id. 
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letter was a heavily stylized “K” or consisted of other elements.134  
Nevertheless, the Board of Appeal argued that the aural comparison of 
the two signs coincided “in the identical pronunciation of the letter 
combination ‘PK.’”135  Based on this observation, the Board held that the 
signs, when taken “as a whole[,] are phonetically only similar to a low 
degree.”136  Even though the senior mark would have been a mouthful to 
pronounce and hid some of its word elements, the junior mark also 
attempted to cleverly disguise the letter “K,” which appears to consist of 
an “I” and a “<” in its figurative style.137  When the junior mark is taken 
as “PK,” its phonetics would not have correlated to the senior mark.138  
Moreover, the Board of Appeal applied sound judgment to find the signs 
phonetically dissimilar, which was a comparably different holding than 
other cases.139  For example, in MIP Metro Group Intellectual Prop. GmBH 
& Co. KG v. Invicta Watch Co. of Am., Inc., the signs ACTIVE and ACTIVA 
for sports watches were in dispute.140  The Board of Appeal found that 
the signs contained a “high degree of phonetic similarity” because of 
their pronunciation among Spanish and German consumers.141 
In Neuland-Verein Tiergerchte Und Umweltschonende Nutztlerhaltung 
e.V. v. Nijland B.V., the controversy surrounded how the marks 
NEULAND and NEWLAND are pronounced by German and English 
speaking food consumers.142  The senior mark consisted of one word, 
NEULAND, along with a graphic representation of a hen, cow, and 
pig.143  The junior mark consisted only of NEWLAND FOOD.144  Thus, 
                                                 
134 Id. ¶ 37. 
135 Id. ¶ 39. 
136 Id.  Furthermore, summing up the decision of the opposition division, which held: 
Aurally, the earlier mark will be pronounced as 
[PE/KA/CHE/PA/KER] and the contested mark as [PE/KA].  The 
signs coincide in the syllables [PE/KA] and differ in the additional 
syllables [CHE/PA/KER] of the earlier mark.  Furthermore, the signs 
share two letters, both consonants, in the same position and differ in 
eight letters.  Accordingly, the signs have only a low degree of aural 
similarity. 
Id. ¶ 6. 
137 Id. ¶ 52. 
138 Id. ¶ 6. 
139 Id.¶ 52. 
140 Case R 915/2006-4, MIP Metro Grp. Intellectual Prop. GmbH & Co. KG v. Invicta 
Watch Co. of Am., Inc., 2008 OHIM ¶¶ 1–3 (4th Bd. Appeal May 23, 2008) (OHIM, EU case 
law). 
141 Id. ¶ 22. 
142 Case R 378/2009-2, Neuland-Verein Tiergerechte Und Umweltschonende 
Nutztlerhaltung e.V. v. Nijland B.V., 2009 OHIM ¶ 9 (2d Bd. Appeal Nov. 2, 2009) (OHIM, 
EU case law). 
143 Id. ¶ 4. 
144 Id. ¶ 9. 
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the former mark indicates food, while the latter mark has the word 
FOOD as a dominant element.  The Second Board of Appeal thrust the 
proverbial consumer into the heart of its reasoning and stated, “A 
customer may ask for a ‘NEWLAND’ steak for example which can be 
easily confused with a ‘NEULAND’ steak by the butcher.”145  It was as if 
John Doe went to shop at the bottom of the street and asked for Newland, 
while Mr. and Mrs. Highflyerberg went in the opposite direction to get 
some Neuland steak. 
Regardless of whether the consumers are German speaking, the 
aural similarity of the food product signs were not that different.  The 
Board of Appeal reasoned that consumers are educated English 
speakers, and therefore “[a]ural similarity is at least as important” to 
hold that “the trade marks are phonetically similar to a normal 
extent.”146  This case is one of many that illustrates how far an alleged 
infringer will go to compete with a more established business.  The case 
shows a brazen attempt at “passing off,” a concept recognized under the 
common law of torts, and exhibits a potential violation of Germany’s 
unfair competition laws.  However, the case highlights the broader 
problem of pronunciation, or aural similarities, of signs and how such 
similarities are addressed when they are encountered by a linguistically 
and culturally homogeneous population in the relevant market. 
OHIM has also discussed trademark infringement in banking, 
finance, and industry.  For example, in Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc. v. 
Lombard Risk Sys. Ltd. & Lombard Risk Consultants Ltd., the Board of 
Appeal argued that the senior and junior marks were phonetically 
similar.147  Royal Bank of Scotland had sought to register a CTM, 
LOMBARD DIRECT, for financial services.148  The proprietor of the 
senior mark, LOMBARD RISK, opposed the registry and the opposition 
division agreed.149  When the Board of Appeal considered the case, it 
argued that “[t]he marks are phonetically similar to the extent that they 
share the word ‘LOMBARD’ which is the initial verbal element of both 
marks.”150  The Board found that the marks were phonetically similar, 
even though both marks have “a different number and sequence of 
                                                 
145 Id. ¶ 27. 
146 Id.  Further, the court stated that “the signs are similar since the only difference is the 
letter ‘U’ in the earlier trade mark which is replaced by a ‘W’ in the contested trade mark, 
which is phonetically identical.”  Id. ¶ 28. 
147 Case R 370/2004-4, Royal Bank of Scot. Grp. Plc. v. Lombard Risk Sys. Ltd., 2005 
OHIM ¶ 14 (4th Bd. Appeal July 21, 2005) (OHIM, EU case law). 
148 Id. ¶ 1. 
149 Id. ¶ 2. 
150 Id. ¶ 14. 
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syllables,” which were phonetically different.151  But the Board argued 
that it was the dominant element of the senior mark that made them 
phonetically similar.152 
In contrast, in the case of Arte G.E.I.E Ass’n Relative A La Television 
Europeenne v. Artesia, the Board held that the marks were phonetically 
dissimilar.153  It made a distinction between the two marks, stating that 
“[p]honetically, ‘artesia’ is pronounced in four syllables ‘AR-TE-SI-YA’ 
or in three ‘AR-TE-SYA,’ while the opponent’s is pronounced in two 
syllables ‘AR-TE.’”154  The Board of Appeal opined that the rhythm and 
intonation of both marks were different, noting that the amount of 
syllables in the junior mark was twice the phonetic length of the senior 
mark, which was a significant difference.155  This case was more than just 
a tussle over phonetics.  The Board of Appeal also engaged in an 
extensive assessment of the likelihood of appreciation.  In particular, the 
Board focused on the global assessment and found the presence of global 
appreciation, explaining that the average consumer was well-informed 
and “reasonably observant and circumspect.”156 
Whenever the judicial bodies consider likelihood of confusion, the 
consumer or relevant public is generally described as “reasonably well-
informed, reasonably observant and circumspect.”157  Two observations 
can be made about such a description of consumers:  (1) it is a very 
general description, which leaves a substantial amount of room for 
courts to categorize consumers; and (2) it places consumers in two 
categories, including the reasonably well-informed consumer and 
consumers who are observant and circumspect.  In this regard, one may 
argue that John Doe and Mary Jane are likely seen as well-informed, 
while Mr. and Mrs. Highflyerberg are circumspect.  The latter group is 
not only observant, but they also tend to spend above the average 
                                                 
151 Id. 
152 Id. 
153 Case R 1306/2008-2, Arte G.E.I.E Ass’n Relative A La Television Europeenne v. 
Artesia, 2009 OHIM ¶ 38 (2d Bd. Appeal Nov. 6, 2009) (OHIM, EU case law). 
154 Id. 
155 Id.; see also id. ¶ 7 (highlighting the earlier decision of the opposition division). 
156 Id. ¶ 27; see also id. ¶ 25 (citing Case C-342/97, Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer & Co. GmbH 
v. Klijsen Handel BV, 1999 E.C.R. I-3819, ¶ 18) (“The likelihood of confusion must be 
appreciated globally, in accordance with the relevant public’s perception of the signs and 
of the goods and services in question, taking into account all factors relevant to the 
circumstances of the case. . . .”). 
157 Royal Bank of Scotl. Grp. Plc., 2005, OHIM ¶ 19; see also Case T-157/10, Barilla G. e R. 
Fratelli SpA v. OHIM, 2012 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS ¶ 18 (Mar. 23, 2012) (utilizing this same 
language in its analysis); Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer & Co. GmbH, 1999 E.C.R. at I-3841 (citing 
Case C-210/96, Gut Springenheide & Tusky v. Oberkreisdirektor des Kreises Steinfurt, 
1998 E.C.R. I-4691, ¶ 31) (illustrating further the use of this language). 
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consumer or represent the industrialists who are consumers.  The next 
section discusses the importance of the global appreciation test when 
determining the likelihood of confusion. 
2. Global Appreciation 
There is no hierarchical system for determining the likelihood of 
confusion.  Rather, the CJEU has used case law to develop key sets of 
principles to aid in its analysis.  The key principle that has emerged for 
determining the likelihood of confusion is global appreciation.  The 
global appreciation test is interconnected with the other principles, such 
as similarity of the marks.158  It creates a universe where global 
appreciation is a sun-like structure that breathes life and light into the 
dark maze of likelihood of confusion.  The CJEU emphasized this 
principle in Becker, stating: 
It is also settled case-law that the global appreciation of 
the likelihood of confusion, in relation to the visual, 
aural or conceptual similarity of the marks in question, 
must be based on the overall impression given by the 
marks, bearing in mind, in particular, their distinctive 
and dominant components.  The perception of the marks 
by the average consumer of the goods or services in 
question plays a decisive role in the global appreciation 
of that likelihood of confusion.159 
The OHIM v. Shaker di L. Laudato & C. Sas decision breathed new life 
into the global appreciation test.  The Shaker dispute primarily concerned 
the similarity of two signs involving sour lemons.160  The CJEU held that 
                                                 
158 See supra Part II.B.1 (providing a thorough discussion of the similarities requirement 
and comparing it to the idea of identity in trademark law). 
159 Case C-51/09 P, Barbara Becker v. Harman Int’l Indus., Inc., 2010 EUR-Lex CELEX 
LEXIS ¶ 33 (June 24, 2010).  There are a number of key cases in which the CJEU elaborates 
upon the global appreciation test.  See Case C-334/05 P, OHIM v. Shaker di L. Laudato & C. 
Sas, 2007 E.C.R. I-4541, I-4553 (explaining the global assessment of likelihood of confusion); 
Case C-120/04, Medion AG v. Thomson Multimedia Sales Ger. & Austria GmbH, 2005 
E.C.R. I-8565, I-8573 (detailing the global assessment of likelihood of confusion.); Lloyd 
Schuhfabrik Meyer & Co. GmbH, 1999 E.C.R. at I-3839 (“[L]ikelihood of confusion on the part 
of the public must be appreciated globally, taking into account all factors relevant to the 
circumstances of the case.”); Case C-251/95, Sabel BV v. Puma AG, 1997 E.C.R. I-6214, I-
6224 (discussing the utilization of global appreciation). 
160 Shaker di L. Laudato & C. Sas, 2007 E.C.R. at I-4542–45.  The senior sign consisted of the 
word mark LIMONCHELO while the junior mark (figurative) consisted of a round dish 
decorated with lemons.  Id. at I-4544–45.  In addition to its realistic representation of a dish, 
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“the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion, in relation to the 
visual, aural or conceptual similarity of the marks in question, must be 
based on the overall impression given by the marks, bearing in mind, in 
particular, their distinctive and dominant components.”161  This finding 
by the CJEU was based on its previous decisions, but what places Shaker 
in a field of its own was its assessment of the phonetic/word mark and 
the figurative mark.  Shaker had reasoned that “a phonetic and 
conceptual similarity can neutralise the dominant visual element, the 
dominant element thereby being deprived of any use in the assessment 
of the likelihood of confusion.”162  Shaker’s line of reasoning was treated 
earlier by Advocate General Kokott in the following way: 
The premiss that two marks may be regarded as similar 
only if they correspond as to the dominant component 
accordingly covers only a particular category of 
cases. . . . It is only if all other components of the mark 
are negligible that the dominant component alone can be 
assessed as to similarity.163 
It was this reasoning that the CJEU essentially adopted when it held that 
more than one component of the mark must be assessed when 
considering likelihood of confusion.164 
This case made its way to the CJEU because the OHIM applied to the 
CJEU for an annulment of the GC decision, which found that there was 
no likelihood of confusion between the marks.165  In the context of the 
                                                                                                             
it is made distinctive by its contrasting colors, its large size, and the realistic depictions of 
lemons on its borders, giving it a quite particular visual attraction.  Id. at I-4547. 
161 Id. at I-4553. 
162 Id. at I-4550.  The dominant element of the trademark consisted of the round dish 
decorated with lemons.  Id. at I-4547. 
163 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, Case C-334/05 P, OHIM v. Shaker di L. Laudato 
& C. Sas, 2007 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS ¶ 21 (Mar. 8, 2007). 
164 Shaker di L. Laudato & C. Sas, 2007 E.C.R. at I-4541, I-4555.  The court offered the 
following explanation: 
It is important to note that, according to the case-law of the Court, in 
the context of consideration of the likelihood of confusion, assessment 
of the similarity between two marks means more than taking just one 
component of a composite trade mark and comparing it with another 
mark.  On the contrary, the comparison must be made by examining 
each of the marks in question as a whole, which does not mean that the 
overall impression conveyed to the relevant public by a composite 
trade mark may not, in certain circumstances, be dominated by one or 
more of its components. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
165 Case T-7/04, Shaker di L. Laudato & C. Sas v. OHIM, 2005 E.C.R. II-2309, II-2329–30 
(“The dominance of the figurative representation of a round dish decorated with lemons in 
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global assessment of the likelihood of confusion, the GC further held that 
“the average consumer has only occasionally the opportunity to carry 
out a direct comparison of the various trade marks but must rely on his 
imperfect mental image of them.”166  According to the GC, the dominant 
element of the mark was “of major importance in the overall [global] 
assessment of the sign because the consumer looking at a label for a 
strong alcoholic drink takes notice of, and remembers, the dominant 
element of the sign, which enables him to repeat the experience on the 
occasion of a subsequent purchase.”167  However, the CJEU rejected the 
GC’s reasoning, because other cases have established the global 
assessment framework for likelihood of confusion.168  There was no 
explanation for why the GC failed to consider the global assessment of 
the likelihood of confusion within the parameters of the established case 
law.169  The CJEU threw the case right back to the GC, requiring it to 
consider the global criteria for likelihood of confusion.170  The ruling by 
the CJEU presumably left a sour taste in the mouth of the GC. 
The discussion above illustrates how courts handle the factors for the 
likelihood of confusion assessment.  Courts emphasize the need to take 
into account the holy trinity of similarities of the marks when assessing 
what is essentially the holy grail of likelihood of confusion—global 
assessment.  One could argue that the factors that make up the 
similarities requirement—visual, conceptual, and aural—sit on a level 
playing field, while the broad notion of the similarities requirement and 
global assessment forms some sort of hierarchy in determining the 
likelihood of confusion.  However, this Article asserts the opposite.  The 
factors for determining likelihood of confusion do not form any sort of 
hierarchy, and the trinity factors for the similarities test are not as level 
as one would initially think.  Rather, they are unbalanced and must be 
assessed with that in mind, which is a position that the GC has 
essentially endorsed.171   
                                                                                                             
comparison with the other components of the mark claimed prevents any likelihood of 
confusion arising from visual, phonetic or conceptual similarities between the words 
‘limonchelo’ and ‘limoncello’ which appear in the marks at issue.”). 
166 Id. at II-2330. 
167 Id. 
168 See Shaker di L. Laudato & C. Sas, 2007 E.C.R. at I-4555 (explaining that the GC failed to 
properly carry out a global assessment of the likelihood of confusion). 
169 Id. 
170 Id. at I-4556. 
171 E.g., Case T-288/08, Cadila Healthcare Ltd. v. OHIM, 2012 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 
¶ 64 (Mar. 15, 2012) (“[I]n the context of the global assessment of the likelihood of 
confusion, the visual, phonetic or conceptual aspects of the signs at issue do not always have the 
same weight and it is appropriate then to examine the objective conditions under which the 
marks may be present on the market.”) (emphasis added); see Case T-157/10, Barilla G. e R. 
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The holy trinity is unbalanced, because it navigates through a group 
of customers who are not mono-linguistically similar, sending conflicting 
signals as to both origin and source quality.  Therefore, the tests for 
likelihood of confusion must shift to narrower parameters, such as initial 
interest confusion, point of sale confusion, or post-sale confusion.172  This 
Article discusses the latter in the next section. 
III.  THE NATURE OF POST-SALE CONFUSION IN EUROPEAN TRADEMARK LAW 
The notion of post-sale confusion is relatively new to European 
trademark law and, consequently, it lacks tradition.  Framing a theory of 
post-sale confusion can often vary, especially when it is framed under 
unfair competition law in countries like Germany, or the common law 
action of passing off in the United Kingdom.173  In this discussion, the 
member-state will be replaced by the federal entity—the EU—and, 
therefore, post-sale confusion will be based on the broader EU trademark 
law. 
The post-sale confusion doctrine will largely be discussed in the 
manner and sequence in which it worked its way through the European 
courts, both national courts (“lower courts”), the OHIM Board of Appeal, 
the GC, and the upper CJEU.174  Because the discussion is on European 
trademark jurisprudence, this Article invariably refers to American 
trademark jurisprudence and how the doctrine of post-sale confusion 
developed within the various circuit courts.  It is interesting to note that 
a 2005 study on American trademark jurisprudence concluded that only 
a small percentage (1.5%) of the opinions sampled found post-sale 
                                                                                                             
Fratelli SpA v. OHIM, 2012 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS ¶ 25 (Mar. 23, 2012) (explaining that no 
greater weight was attributed to the phonetic aspect than the conceptual aspect). 
172 See supra note 39 and accompanying text (providing a general background for these 
three concepts). 
173 See Jörg Weberndörfer, “Post-Sale” Confusion and the Parameters of Opposition Decisions, 
in HARMONISIERUNG DES MARKENRECHTS:  FESTSCHRIFT FÜR ALEXANDER VON MÜHLENDAHL 
ZUM 65. GEBURTSTAG AM 20. OKTOBER 2005 [Harmonizing of Trade Mark Law:  Essays in Honor 
of Alexander von Muhlendahl for His 65th Birthday, on October 20, 2005] 255, 258–59 (Verena 
von Bomhard, Jochen Pagenberg & Detlef Schennen eds. 2005).  Weberndörfer notes that 
Lego Systems discusses post-sale confusion under unfair competition law in Italy.  Id. at 259 
n.14 (citing Lego Systems A/S & Lego Spa. v. Tyco Indus. Inc. & Arco Falc Srl, [2002] EIPR 
136).  In relation to the United Kingdom, Weberndörfer suggests that it was a case from the 
New Zealand High Court that prompted the United Kingdom to take notice of post-sale 
confusion.  Id. at n.19 (citing Levi’s v. Kimbeyr Inv., (1994) 1 NZLR 332, 335 (HC)). 
174 See infra Part II.B (discussing important cases involving post-sale confusion); see also 
Case T-483/04, Armour Pharm. Co. v. OHIM, 2006 E.C.R. II-4112, II-4124 (“The applicant 
further maintains that the likelihood of confusion on the part of the public does not exist 
only at the time of purchase; post-sale confusion has long been taken into account in the 
United States.”). 
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confusion, suggesting that claims on post-sale confusion were “outside 
of the mainstream of trademark litigation.”175  Even though this study 
only gives insight into which courts often find post-sale confusion 
infringement, it does not necessarily tell the entire story on the 
development of the doctrine within that jurisdiction.  The following 
discussion on post-sale confusion is specifically related to decisions in 
which the courts have recognized post-sale confusion; however, it is a 
possibility that other courts have also recognized the doctrine of post-
sale confusion or even rejected it outright.176 
A. The Meaning and Expansion of Post-Sale Confusion 
The starting premise for understanding the notion of post-sale 
confusion in intellectual property rights and trademarks is the decision 
by the English High Court in Datacard.177  This well-written decision was 
relatively recent, and thus it contains considerable insight into post-sale 
confusion.  In that dispute, post-sale confusion was defined as 
“confusion on the part . . . of the public as to the trade origin of goods or 
services . . . after the goods and services have been purchased[.]”178 
The definitional scope of post-sale confusion does not present any 
problems for trademark law, because most agree that this phenomenon 
occurs on the part of consumers after the goods have been bought.179  It 
is important to note how courts have recognized the post-sale confusion 
doctrine in European trademark law.  In Datacard, for instance, the 
dispute arose due to a complaint by Datacard that Eagle infringed on 
                                                 
175 Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 94 
CALIF. L. REV. 1581, 1595 n.65 (2006).  Further, “[a]s for post-sale confusion, only 6% 
(nineteen) of the opinions sampled considered a claim of post-sale confusion, and thirteen 
of these came from the Second Circuit, which found post-sale confusion in only three of 
these opinions.  Overall, post-sale confusion was found in 1.5% (five) of the opinions 
sampled.”  Id. 
176 See, e.g., Greece:  Indirect Rejection of the Post-Sale Confusion Doctrine?, MARQUES (Jan. 14, 
2009), http://www.marques.org/Class46/Article.asp?D_A=20090114&XID=BHA907 
(discussing the Greek court’s indirect rejection of the post-sale confusion doctrine in 
analyzing Kraft’s TOBLERONE mark for chocolate in Greece and the junior mark 
ALMONDO). 
177 See generally Datacard Corp. v. Eagle Techs. Ltd., [2011] EWHC (Pat) 244, [279]–[89] 
(Eng.) (discussing previous case law regarding post-sale confusion in relation to likelihood 
of confusion). 
178 Id. [277]. 
179 See Ehrlich, supra note 11, at 267 n.2 (“Post-sale confusion occurs when persons, other 
than the actual purchasers of a product, view the mark on a product after it has been sold 
to the actual purchaser, such as persons who use a product that another person buys.  It 
also occurs when passers-by see the mark on the product that an actual purchaser is 
wearing . . . .”). 
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two of its patents and trademarks.180  By virtue of its position as a market 
leader in supplying card printers and associated services, Datacard used 
a variety of product marks in conjunction with its house mark 
DATACARD.181  Eagle, on the other hand, sold similar products to 
Datacard and even sold products manufactured by Datacard.182  
Datacard sued Eagle, arguing that Eagle infringed on its trademark 
primarily because of Eagle’s use of the trademark DATACARD on its 
website, labels, and reseller’s website.183 
This decision is significant because it was one of the first cases that 
explicitly raised and coherently argued the notion of post-sale 
confusion.184  Further, it was significant because the English High Court 
constructed post-sale confusion within the context of Article 5(1)(b)—the 
likelihood of confusion provision discussed earlier in this Article.185  The 
court went further in its analysis than the previous CJEU judgments.186  
Because it was a recent decision, the substance of the decision is still 
fresh and provides enough flesh for a thorough analysis of the post-sale 
confusion doctrine. 
Post-sale confusion arguments within trademark law have never 
been successful.  In academic institutions and courtrooms, these 
arguments are rebuffed or dismissed as being vague or stifling.187  But 
the notion of post-sale confusion is rather simple to digest, because it 
“involves the loss in prestige a senior user suffers as a result of the junior 
                                                 
180 Datacard Corp., [2011] EWHC, [1]. 
181 Id. [2]–[3]. 
182 Id. [237]. 
183 Id. 
184 See id. [276]–[78] (mentioning post-sale confusion’s relevance in analyzing the case); 
see also Clinique Labs., Inc. v. Dep Corp., 945 F. Supp. 547, 558 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding that 
there was a likelihood of post-sale confusion). 
185 Datacard Corp., [2011] EWHC, [276]–[78]. 
186 Id. [ 279], [286]–[89]. 
187 See Peter O’Byrne & Ben Allgrove, Post-Sale Confusion, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 
315, 322 (2007) (arguing that post-sale confusion influences post-sale consumer choices, but 
that common law needs to develop in parallel to help post-sale confusion to be included as 
a consideration under trademark infringement law).  See generally Johnson, supra note 9.  
This analysis is, more or less, critical but appears to be in defense of consumers: 
Consumers’ interests in trademarks are vast and varied.  Clearly, they 
are not adequately explained in purely economic terms.  Relevant 
consumer interests include social signaling in the post-sale 
environment . . . . The prevention of post-sale, non-consumer 
confusion about the status of the consumer who purchased the good 
(relative utility) certainly indicates that courts have a great concern for 
consumer interests in trademarks. 
Id. at 1334–35.  See id. at 1336 (“Post-sale confusion is a second area in which courts seems 
to have begun to drift from the protection of consumer interests.  Courts most often protect 
relative utility through the post-sale confusion doctrine.”) (footnote omitted). 
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user’s branded product.”188  This definition is broad, but the damage 
post-sale confusion can cause, based on this definition, to the essential 
function of the mark should not be ignored.  In Datacard, the court 
formulated the nature of post-sale confusion as “confusion on the part 
of . . . the public as to the trade origin of goods or services in relation to 
which the impugned sign has been used which only arises after the 
goods or services have been purchased.”189  This definition focuses on 
goods that have already been purchased, which is the essential period 
when consumers say:  “oh no, I thought this was manufactured by Tide 
Inc.”  The implication then, as Berger and Halligan explained in their 
Litigators’ Guide, is that “[p]ost-sale confusion can damage the reputation 
of the trademark owner because consumers’ experiences with the 
inferior product tarnish their image of the legitimate product.”190 
This logic can be applied to Och-Ziff.  Though the case was not about 
post-sale confusion, it presented such a scenario because of the name 
similarities, and consumers could easily assume that the junior mark was 
one of the financial products of the senior mark, Och-Ziff.191  However, 
Justice Arnold later explained that he did not discuss post-sale confusion 
in Och-Ziff “since it did not arise.”192  Justice Arnold’s admission 
suggested to the claimants that they would have fared better arguing 
post-sale confusion.  Even if post-sale confusion had indeed arisen in 
Och-Ziff, a speculative analysis on how Justice Arnold would have ruled 
is probably pointless at this moment.  We now have a full understanding 
of his views on post-sale confusion, which will be further analyzed 
below.  Interestingly, in a similar U.S. case, a federal judge found that 
two identical marks used in the financial services industry were not 
                                                 
188 JAMES T. BERGER & R. MARK HALLIGAN, TRADEMARK SURVEYS:  A LITIGATOR’S GUIDE 
§ 5.04, at 92 (2012).  The following excerpt provides a straight-forward approach to the 
doctrine of post-sale confusion: 
The post-sale confusion doctrine aims to extend the scope of the 
likelihood of confusion question to post-sale situations.  Instead of 
looking for possible confusion only at the point of sale, it recognizes 
that the courts should also consider whether third parties may be 
misled by viewing the items after the purchaser has put them to their 
intended use.  In essence, post-sale confusion occurs when a third 
party viewing either the original manufacturer’s product or the 
infringing manufacturer’s product mistakes one for the other, and the 
mistake influences her subsequent purchasing decisions. 
Moon-Ki Chai, Note, Protection of Fragrances Under the Post-Sale Confusion Doctrine, 80 
TRADEMARK REP. 368, 373 (1990) (footnotes omitted). 
189 Datacard Corp., [2011] EWHC, [277]. 
190 BERGER & HALLIGAN, supra note 188, at 92 (footnote omitted). 
191 See supra notes 42–45 (analyzing the Och-Ziff decision). 
192 Datacard Corp., [2011] EWHC, [277]. 
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likely to be confused.193  In Omicron Capital, LLC v. Omicron Capital, LLC, 
the court found in favor of the defendant and held that there was no 
likelihood of confusion after applying the Polaroid factors.194 
Datacard revived the notion of post-sale confusion in the British 
courts and indeed in Europe, even though its origins are essentially 
American.195  Other courts, for instance the United Kingdom and 
                                                 
193 Omicron Capital, LLC v. Omicron Capital, LLC, 433 F. Supp. 2d 382, 394 (S.D.N.Y. 
2006). 
194 Id. at 389, 394.  See generally Heather L. Jensen, Are Identical Marks in the Same Field of 
Services Likely to Be Confused? Omicron Capital, LLC v. Omicron Capital, LLC, 97 
TRADEMARK REP. 1366 (2007) (discussing the Omicron case). 
195 See Act of Oct. 9, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-772, 76 Stat. 769, 773–74 (1962) (describing the 
conduct that results in trademark infringement liability, noting specifically that conduct 
causing confusion can result in a civil action).  The first set of cases to expressly recognize 
post-sale confusion in American trademark law jurisprudence concerned clothing.  See also 
Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 632 F.2d 817, 822 (9th Cir. 1980).  David M. Tichane 
explains that in Levi Strauss the defendant raised the issue of post-sale confusion: 
Wrangler focuses upon the condition of its pants when sold and limits 
its argument to “point of sale” circumstances.  However, billboards 
and other point of sale materials are removed by the purchaser and 
have no confusion-obviating effect when the pants are worn.  
Wrangler’s use of its projecting label is likely to cause confusion 
among prospective purchasers who carry even an imperfect 
recollection of Strauss’s mark and who observe Wrangler’s projecting 
label after the point of sale. 
Tichane, supra note 9, at 406 (footnote omitted) (quoting Levi Strauss & Co., 532 F.2d at 822).  
See, e.g., Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1245 (6th Cir. 1991) (rejecting the 
notion that a plaintiff can only recover if there is point of sale confusion and suggesting 
that Congress intended to offer more extensive protection); Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 872 (2d Cir. 1986) (noting that post-sale confusion is an 
actionable claim).  In the Lois case, for example, the Court noted, “[I]t is equally clear that 
post-sale confusion as to source is actionable under the Lanham Act. . . . [P]ost-sale 
confusion would involve consumers seeing the appellant’s jeans outside of the retail store, 
perhaps being worn by a passer-by.”  Id. at 872.  See also Payless Shoesource, Inc., v. Reebok 
Int’l Ltd., 998 F.2d 985, 991 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (denying a preliminary injunction and 
instructing the parties to consider post-sale confusion); Nabisco Brands, Inc., v. Conusa 
Corp., 722 F. Supp. 1287, 1291 (M.D.N.C. 1989) (finding a likelihood of post-sale confusion 
because the similarities in the parties’ candies would not be evident until a consumer 
opened the purchased candy).  “Traditional confusion analysis focuses on post-sale 
consequences—in which the customer is likely to be confused about the source of goods 
even after they have been purchased.”  Chatam Int’l, Inc., v. Bodum, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 2d 
549, 557 (E.D. Pa. 2001).  See Weberndörfer, supra note 173, at 258–59 (providing a synopsis 
on post-sale confusion from a European perspective); see also TOBIAS COHEN JEHORAM, 
CONSTANT VAN NISPEN & TONY HUYDECOPER, EUROPEAN TRADEMARK LAW:  COMMUNITY 
TRADEMARK LAW AND HARMONIZED NATIONAL TRADEMARK LAW § 7.5.6, at 289–90 (2010) 
(providing another perspective of European post-sale confusion).  Author Jehoram, Nispen, 
and Huydeoper discuss the European approach to post-sale confusion: 
In line with US practice, the term ‘post-sale confusion’ is sometimes 
used when the likelihood of confusion does not occur only at the time 
of sale/purchase of the good, but also afterwards.  Such post sale 
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Germany, arguably began to follow American trademark law, as is seen 
in Datacard.196  Post-sale confusion in trademark infringement cases 
emanates from the evolution of the consumer confusion standard, which 
developed in early U.S. case law, such as Borden Ice Cream Co. v. Borden’s 
Condensed Milk Co.197  In addition to early case law, the evolving nature 
of the modern Lanham Act played a role in how post-sale confusion has 
been construed, beginning with the 1905 Trademark Act,198 the 
subsequent adoption of the 1946 Lanham Act,199 and then later 
amendments to the Lanham Act.200  In the 1962 amendment to the 
Lanham Act,201 language on post-sale confusion was literally inserted 
                                                                                                             
confusion can occur particularly in the event of merchandising articles, 
in what is referred to as ‘me-too’ products (where the product’s 
appearance corresponds to the original trademarked product) . . . .  
 
. . . . 
 
[Post-sale confusion] is relevant in the practical assessment of the 
likelihood of confusion because this emphasizes that not only must the 
circumstances at the time of the sale/purchase of the product in 
question be examined but also the subsequent situation as well. 
Id. 
196 See Ludwig Kouker, Is the Purpose of the Trademark Law Limited Only to Protecting 
Purchasers?—Analysis Under the United States and German Trademark Law, 87 TRADEMARK 
REP. 151, 151 (1997) (discussing two cases involving trademark infringement in Germany 
during the early 1990s that concerned post-sale confusion).  The following excerpt provides 
examples of German courts applying the post-sale confusion doctrine: 
 The two German Hanseatic Appeal Courts have issued decisions 
regarding post-sale confusion in parallel trademark infringement 
actions brought against the same offender.  The defendant—a supplier 
of humorous novelty items—offered a large quantity of individually 
packaged condoms for sale in a candy jar or display box, each 
individually wrapped and bearing a different label. 
 The subject of the dispute in the Hamburg proceedings was a 
condom packaged in a transparent wrapper with a sticker indicating 
“NIVEAU milk” and another sticker stating “It’s like NIVEA for the 
first time.”  The subject of the proceedings simultaneously brought 
before the Bremen court was a condom packaged in a folded pack that 
looked like a book of matches, with an illustration of a MARS candy 
bar and the imprint “A MARS a day for Sex-Sport and Play.”  In both 
cases, an injunction was granted against the defendant.  On appeal, the 
Bremen and Hamburg courts reached different conclusions. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
197 Borden Ice Cream Co. v. Borden’s Condensed Milk Co., 201 F. 510 (7th Cir. 1912). 
198 The Trademark Act of 1905, Pub. L. No. 58-84, 33 Stat. 724, § 5(b) (1905). 
199 Lanham Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427, §§ 2(d), 5 (1946) (explaining the 
dangers that are likely to cause confusion or mistake in the mind of the public). 
200 The Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1141n (2006). 
201 Act of Oct. 9, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-772, 76 Stat. 769, §§ 11, 20 (1962). 
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(depending on how one interprets the kerfuffle between potential and 
actual purchasers).202   
Further decisions by the courts went on to suggest that the 
confusion-based standard evolved to the point where various theories 
and factors were important in determining confusion based 
infringements.203  In recent cases, like Gucci, and in older cases, such as 
General Motors Corp. v. Keystone Automotive Industries, Inc., the courts 
found post-sale confusion to be actionable.204  For example, the Sixth 
Circuit Court provided a robust explanation of how post-sale confusion 
may harm a trademark owner.205  In Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen 
of Am. Inc., the Ninth Circuit provided further insight into the effects of 
post-sale confusion.206 
B. The Judicialization of the Doctrine of Post-Sale Confusion in Europe 
This section examines five cases, two of which are from national 
courts and three of which are from the CJEU interpreting Article 5(1)(b) 
                                                 
202 S. REP. NO. 87-2107 (1961), reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2844, 2847 (“The purpose of 
the proposed change is . . . to omit the word ‘purchasers,’ since the provision actually 
relates to potential purchasers as well as to actual purchasers.”). 
203 See supra notes 46–51 and accompanying text (listing the various factor tests utilized 
by statutes and the courts). 
204 See infra notes 314–32 and accompanying text (analyzing and discussing the court’s 
reasoning in the Gucci case); infra note 205 (quoting at length from the General Motors Corp. 
case). 
205 See DINWOODIE & JANIS, supra note 4, at 579 (citing General Motors Corp. v. Keystone 
Auto. Indus., Inc., 453 F.3d 351, 358 (6th Cir. 2006)).  In General Motors Corp., the court made 
the following statement concerning likelihood of confusion with knock-off products in the 
stream of commerce: 
Even without point-of-sale confusion, knockoffs can harm the public 
and the original manufacturer in a number of ways, including:  (1) the 
viewing public, as well as subsequent purchasers, may be deceived if 
expertise is required to distinguish the original from the 
counterfeit, . . . (2) the purchaser of an original may be harmed if the 
widespread existence of knockoffs decreases the original’s value by 
making the previously scarce commonplace, . . . (3) consumers desiring 
high quality products may be harmed if the original manufacturer 
decreases its investment in quality in order to compete more 
economically with less expensive knockoffs, . . . (4) the original 
manufacturer’s reputation for quality may be damaged if individuals 
mistake an inferior counterfeit for the original, . . . (5) the original 
manufacturer’s reputation for rarity may be harmed by the influx of 
knockoffs onto the market, . . . and (6) the original manufacturer may 
be harmed if sales decline due to the public’s fear that what they are 
purchasing may not be the original . . . . 
General Motors Corp., 453 F.3d at 358 (citations omitted). 
206 Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am. Inc., 603 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(discussing numerous cases addressing post-sale confusion in the U.S. market). 
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of the TMD.  Indeed, of the five decisions, Arsenal has had the greatest 
effect on the post-sale confusion standard within the context of European 
trademark jurisprudence.  While the arguments were taking shape in 
Arsenal, another English court raised the specter of post-sale confusion 
but received little notice.  In Société de Produits Nestle SA v. Unilever, 
Justice Jacobs explained the importance of post-sale confusion and even 
suggested that history was on the side of post-sale confusion.207 
1. National Courts 
a. Benetton v. Star (Netherlands) 
The Supreme Court of the Netherlands was one of the national 
courts that interpreted Article 5(1)(b) of the TMD to include post-sale 
confusion.  In Benetton v. Star, the Dutch Supreme Court held that a 
trademark can be registered based on the shape and attractiveness of the 
mark,208 which was also noted by Justice Arnold in Datacard.209  When 
the case reached the CJEU, that court rejected the Dutch Supreme Court’s 
ruling regarding the registrability of a trademark based on shape and 
attractiveness.210  The claimant, G-Star, had brought an action against the 
Italian fashion house, Benetton, before the Amsterdam District Court to 
preclude any manufacturing, marketing, or distribution of trousers with 
the mark Benetton in the Netherlands.211  G-Star claimed that Benetton 
infringed the trademark rights attached to its Elwood design trousers by 
manufacturing and distributing a similar design, which also included an 
                                                 
207 Société de Produits Nestlé SA v. Unilever Plc, [2002] EWHC (Ch) 2709, [49] (Eng.) 
(“Post sale effects of a trade mark are indeed important.  They have always been so.  The 
very earliest trade marks in history consist of marks on pottery which tell you both at the 
point of sale and always thereafter who the maker was.”). 
208 http://jure.nl/av3384HR 8 september 2006, NJ 2006, 492 m.nt. Eerste Kamer 
(Benetton Group SpA/Eiseres) (Neth.).  The Court specifically stated: 
 . . . De eerste klacht van onderdeel (ii) houdt in dat het hof ten 
onrechte betekenis heeft toegekend aan de mogelijkheid van zogeheten 
'post sale confusion’, dat wil zeggen de verwarring die kan ontstaan bij 
het publiek dat wordt geconfronteerd met het inbreukmakende teken 
nadat het daarmee gemerkte product is aangeschaft en buiten de 
omgeving waar het is aangekocht.  Deze klacht faalt, aangezien de 
mogelijkheid van post sale confusion een rol kan spelen bij de 
beoordeling van het voor merkinbreuk van belang zijnde 
verwarringsgevaar . . . . 
Id. [3.10]. 
209 Datacard Corp. v. Eagle Techs. Ltd., [2011] EWHC (Pat) 244, [287] (Eng.) (citing 
JEHORAM ET AL., supra note 195, at 290). 
210 Case C-371/06, Benetton Group SpA v. G-Star Int’l BV, 2008 E.T.M.R. 4, ¶ 17. 
211 Id. ¶ 10. 
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overlap kneepad and two lines of sloping stitching from the hip height to 
crotch height.212 
Both parties failed in their claims and counterclaims at the 
Amsterdam District Court and filed appeals at the Amsterdam Regional 
Court, which found in favor of G-Star on grounds of reputation and 
“aesthetic attractiveness.”213  Benetton further challenged this decision at 
the Supreme Court, which found that the “attractiveness of the shape 
was a consequence of its attractiveness linked to recognition of the shape 
as a mark.”214  However, the Dutch Supreme Court referred the case to 
the CJEU, which later concluded that “the shape of a product which 
gives substantial value to that product cannot constitute a trade 
mark.”215 
Aside from Author Jehoram,216 who highlighted the discussion on 
post-sale confusion in the original language,217 there are few other 
reliable English commentaries.  Nevertheless, the case provides insight 
into the application of the post-sale confusion doctrine, though it is 
infrequently applied by European lower courts since it was first heralded 
by Arsenal.  When Benetton was appealed, the CJEU did not discuss post-
sale confusion, but rather cited Philips v. Remington, arguing that if a 
shape is refused registration under Article 3(1)(e) of the TMD, it cannot 
be registered under Article 3(3).218  The CJEU’s inference to post-sale 
confusion justified the construction of a new threshold for trademark 
regulations, which was prompted by the Benelux court’s willingness to 
go beyond the standard of the current EU trademark regulations.  The 
doctrine of post-sale confusion was articulated in more detail in an 
English case, Datacard, and that is the judgment to which we now turn. 
b. Datacard v. Eagle (The United Kingdom) 
Before Datacard, post-sale confusion had its foundation in the 
European trademark law constructed in Arsenal; however, the doctrine 
receded and only recently was the notion of post-sale confusion 
reintroduced.  The claimants in Datacard argued that “post-sale 
confusion was capable of demonstrating the existence of a likelihood of 
                                                 
212 Id. 
213 Id. ¶ 14. 
214 Id. ¶ 17. 
215 Id. ¶ 28. 
216 JEHORAM ET AL., supra note 195, at 289. 
217 Id. at 290 (“In Benelux case law, such likelihood of confusion after the initial sale is 
also recognized as relevant likelihood of confusion.”) (footnote omitted). 
218 Benetton Group SpA v. G-Star Int’l BV, 2007 E.C.R. at I-7711, I-7720. 
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confusion for the purposes of Article 5(1)(b).”219  When Justice Arnold 
decided Datacard, he explained that, pursuant to CJEU case law, “post-
sale confusion can be relied upon in support of a claim under Article 
5(1)(b).”220  Justice Arnold concluded that “in appropriate circumstances 
post-sale confusion can be relied upon as demonstrating the existence of 
a likelihood of confusion under Article 5(1)(b).”221  Although the court 
relied on the previous judgments of the CJEU, the English court did not 
explain whether there are weaknesses in post-sale confusion that may 
deter a finding of post-sale confusion in trademark infringement cases.  
Nevertheless, the difficult nature of establishing the likelihood of 
confusion under European trademark law and the global appreciation 
criterion made the ruling by Justice Arnold a welcomed one.  Although 
the Datacard decision was from a lower court, it placed the issue of post-
sale confusion back into the spotlight of European trademark law after it 
receded under the CJEU rulings of Arsenal, Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. 
Budějovický Budvar, and Ruiz-Picasso v. OHIM decisions.222 
2. The CJEU 
a. Arsenal v. Reed 
Because Arsenal was the first case to introduce the notion of post-sale 
confusion into European trademark law, it took a while before post-sale 
confusion was able to charm its way into the hearts of lower courts 
across the EU.  It has been suggested that “the acknowledgement of post 
sale effects into infringement considerations should not change the 
rationale for [trademark] protection.”223  This is a valid point, and 
perhaps post-sale confusion would best serve as a standard factor test to 
measure its constituent elements when determining the likelihood of 
confusion under Article 51(1)(b) of the TMD.  In Arsenal, the court stated 
“that some consumers, in particular if they come across the goods after they 
have been sold by Mr. Reed and taken away from the stall where the notice 
appears, may interpret the sign as designating Arsenal [soccer club] as the 
undertaking of origin of the goods.”224  With this statement, the court 
                                                 
219 Datacard Corp. v. Eagle Techs. Ltd., [2011] EWHC (Pat) 244, [278] (Eng.). 
220 Id. [286]. 
221 Id. [289]. 
222 Case C-245/02, Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Budĕjovický Budvar, 2004 E.C.R. I-11018. 
223 Spyros Maniatis, Post Sale Effects of a Trade Mark:  Conceptual Necessity or a Gift to Trade 
Mark Proprietors?, in EMERGING ISSUES IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW:  TRADE, 
TECHNOLOGY AND MARKET FREEDOM:  ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF HERCHEL SMITH 176 (Guido 
Westkamp ed., 2007). 
224 Case C-206/01, Arsenal Football Club plc v. Reed, 2002 E.C.R. I-10299, I-10318 
(emphasis added). 
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ventured into the area of post-sale confusion; however, the court may 
have felt that it was neither in its best interest nor its obligation to get 
into a factual analysis of cases, since it is the duty of the referring court to 
complete such a task. 
The defendant in Arsenal, Matthew Reed, was taken to court for 
selling goods bearing the registered trademark of Arsenal soccer club 
without authorization.225  Mr. Reed, however, was aware that his goods 
were unofficial Arsenal products, displaying a sign on his stall to 
indicate that the goods were not official Arsenal products.226  By selling 
the unofficial merchandise, the defendant also faced a passing off claim, 
but it was dismissed by the High Court, stating that Arsenal failed “to 
show actual confusion on the part of the relevant public.”227  After 
considering the other claims, the High Court asked the CJEU for a 
preliminary ruling.228  The CJEU explained that for a trademark to fulfill 
its essential role in the system of undistorted competition, it “must offer 
a guarantee that all the goods or services bearing it have been 
manufactured or supplied under the control of a single undertaking 
which is responsible for their quality.”229  The CJEU further argued that 
the use of a sign is likely to have an impact that would affect the origin 
function of a trademark, opining that “the proprietor must be protected 
against competitors wishing to take unfair advantage of the status and 
reputation of the trade mark by selling products illegally bearing it.”230  
In this passage, the CJEU created a nexus between reputation and how 
such reputation is likely to be harmed in post-sale situations.231 
In discussing Arsenal, the CJEU was onto something, cryptically 
crafting the post-sale confusion doctrine into the reasoning of its 
judgment.232  According to the court, the Arsenal sign was used “to 
create the impression that there is a material link in the course of trade 
                                                 
225 Id. at I-10307. 
226 Id. (“The word or logo(s) on the goods offered for sale, are used solely to adorn the 
product and does not imply or indicate any affiliation or relationship with the 
manufacturers or distributors of any other product, only goods with official Arsenal 
merchandise tags are official Arsenal merchandise.”). 
227 Id. at I-10308. 
228 Id. at I-10299. 
229 Id. at I-10316 (citation omitted). 
230 Id. 
231 Id. 
232 See id. at I-10318 (discussing the possible post-sale confusion that some consumers 
would experience if they came across the actual good after purchasing the infringed 
product).  In Datacard, Justice Arnold noted, “Nevertheless, [57] appears to acknowledge 
the relevance of post-sale confusion when considering the impact of the use of the sign 
(which is not, of course, the same thing as requiring a likelihood of confusion).” Datacard 
Corp. v. Eagle Techs. Ltd., [2011] EWHC (Pat) 244, [280] (Eng.). 
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between the goods concerned and the trade mark proprietor.”233  The 
court then held that the use of an identical sign was “liable to jeopardise 
the guarantee of origin which constitutes the essential function of the 
mark”; thus, the trademark owner may prevent its use under Article 5(1) 
of the TMD.234  The court explained that “uses for purely descriptive 
purposes are excluded from the scope of Article 5(1),” because they 
neither affect the interests of the provision nor do they fall within the 
concept of use.235 
There is a major difference between Datacard and previous CJEU 
decisions, such as Arsenal.  The decisions of the CJEU do not expressly 
mention post-sale confusion, but the Court’s reasoning has left little 
doubt that it was referencing this doctrine.  As Spyros Maniatis also 
pointed out, “In Arsenal the Court had the opportunity to consider post-
sale effects of a trade mark and indicated that they should be taken into 
account,” and, within a broader context, the CJEU was “telling us that 
post sale confusion matters when it affects the function of a trade mark 
as an indicator of origin in the mind of the relevant reasonable 
consumer.”236  But Justice Arnold would later acknowledge in Datacard 
that even though the CJEU “touched on” post-sale confusion in Arsenal 
and other judgments, they were not determinative of post-sale 
confusion.237  The CJEU, in Arsenal, arguably introduced this principle of 
American trademark law into European trademark jurisprudence.  
Consequently, the CJEU could not be determinative, because there were 
no proper factors for determining post-sale confusion at such an early 
stage.  On the other hand, if the CJEU had explained in detail the nature 
of post-sale confusion and its relevance to the likelihood of confusion, 
then the Arsenal judgment would not have left so many doubts as to 
whether the case was, in fact, about post-sale confusion. 
                                                 
233 Arsenal, 2002 E.C.R. at I-10318. 
234 Id. at I-10319.  But see Omicron Capital, LLC v. Omicron Capital, LLC, 433 F. Supp. 2d 
382, 389 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding that there was no trademark infringement despite the 
same name used to designate similar goods).  Additionally, the CJEU has held that the use 
of a sign that is confusingly similar to another’s trademark may still be permitted, so long 
as it stays within honest commercial practices. Case C-100/02 Gerolsteiner Brunnen GmbH 
v. Putsch GmbH, 2004 E.C.R. I-710, I-715. 
235 Arsenal, 2002 E.C.R. at I-10317–18. 
236 Maniatis, supra note 223, at 187.   
 Perhaps a positive statement on post sale confusion coupled with 
a restatement on the scope of infringement provisions could have 
resulted in a conceptually clearer judgment that would not allow 
misconstructions.  But it is because of the position and the role of the 
[CJEU] in the overall judicial process that the judgment failed to elaborate 
further on the nature and extent of post sale effects. 
Id. at 188 (emphasis added). 
237 Datacard, [2011] EWHC, [279]. 
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b. Ruiz-Picasso v. OHIM 
In Ruiz-Picasso, the court explained that trademarks have a post-sale 
purpose, solidifying the previous CJEU judgment and sending a message 
that post-sale confusion existed in trademark infringement.238  The case 
concerned the application for registration of the CTM-PICARO for motor 
vehicles, which was opposed by the Picasso estate, owner of the 
registered mark PICASSO for motor vehicles.239  The case had a long 
history through the various tribunals of the OHIM and the lower and 
upper tribunals of the European High Court.240  In 1999, the Picasso 
estate lodged an opposition against the application by Daimler Chrysler 
for the word mark PICARO, which was filed a year earlier at the 
OHIM.241  The Picasso estate alleged that there was “the existence of a 
likelihood of confusion within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b)” of the 
CTMR.242  The opposition was rejected and later appealed to the Third 
Board of Appeal of the OHIM, which also dismissed the appeal, stating 
that the “marks at issue were not similar at either a phonetic or a visual 
level.”243  The Picasso estate brought an action before the GC to annul the 
previous decision; however, the GC dismissed the action.244  Finally, the 
                                                 
238 Case C-361/04 P, Ruiz-Picasso v. OHIM, 2006 E.C.R. I-660. 
239 Id. at I-664. 
240 Id.  
241 Id. 
242 Id. 
243 Id.; see also Opinion of Advocate General Colomer, Case C-361/04 P, Ruiz-Picasso v. 
OHIM, 2005 E.C.R. I-645, I-647 (“[T]he marks at issue were not phonetically or visually 
similar.”). 
244 Ruiz-Picasso, 2006 E.C.R. at I-668.  The General Court stated that the degree of 
similarity between the double consonant “ss” and “r” was rather “low,” and the signs were 
not “similar from the conceptual point of view.”  Id. at I-665–66.  Furthermore, the GC 
explained that “the word sign PICASSO is well-known as corresponding to the name of the 
famous painter Pablo Picasso is not capable of heightening the likelihood of confusion 
between the two marks for the goods concerned.”  Id. at I-667.  The following excerpt 
captures the full extent of the GC’s reasoning: 
In the context of the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion, it 
must also be taken into account that, in view of the nature of the goods 
concerned and in particular their price and their highly technological 
character, the degree of attention of the relevant public at the time of 
purchase is particularly high.  The possibility raised by the applicants 
that members of the relevant public may also perceive the goods 
concerned in situations in which they do not pay such attention does 
not prevent that degree of attention from being taken into account.  A 
refusal to register a trade mark because of the likelihood of confusion 
with an earlier mark is justified on the ground that such confusion is 
liable to have an undue influence on the consumers concerned when 
they make a choice with respect to the goods or services in question.  It 
follows that account must be taken, for the purposes of assessing the 
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GC judgment was appealed to the CJEU, which confirmed the GC’s 
finding that the average consumer of vehicles would not exhibit a high 
level of attention.245 
There is no doubt that the doctrine of post-sale confusion was 
present in the Ruiz-Picasso judgment; however, the court conspicuously 
applied the doctrine in its opinion.246  If the CJEU’s adoption of post-sale 
confusion originated in Arsenal, then the court’s use of the doctrine in 
Ruiz-Picasso was poorly constructed.  Despite the fact that the appellants 
skillfully introduced the doctrine of post-sale confusion, the Ruiz-Picasso 
court failed to implement it.  Citing Arsenal, which initially crafted the 
post-sale confusion doctrine, the appellants argued that the GC 
misapplied Article 8(1)(b) of the CTMR and failed to consider post-sale 
confusion “according to which the mark must be protected against 
possible confusion not only at the time of purchase of the product 
concerned, but also before or after such a purchase.”247  Even if the 
appellants were guilty of bad lawyering, they achieved a fundamental 
victory by causing the court to recognize post-sale confusion.248 
The doctrine of post-sale confusion in Ruiz-Picasso was more 
skillfully argued by Advocate General Colomer who said that “the Court 
simply used the post-sale confusion argument to confirm that there was 
a breach of trade mark rights.”249  He further explained that whether the 
likelihood of confusion is being assessed in the context of opposition 
proceedings or an infringement of trademarks rights, “both situations 
                                                                                                             
likelihood of confusion, of the level of attention of the average 
consumer at the time when he prepares and makes his choice between 
different goods or services within the category for which the mark is 
registered. 
. . . . 
In light of all the above elements, the degree of similarity between the 
marks at issue is not sufficiently great for it to be considered that the 
relevant public might believe that the goods in question come from the 
same undertaking or, as the case may be, from economically linked 
undertakings.  The Board of Appeal was therefore right to consider 
that there was no likelihood of confusion between them. 
Id. at I-667–68. 
245 Id. at I-677. 
246 Opinion of Advocate General Colomer, supra note 243, at I-645.  The CJEU, in 
applying the notion of post-sale confusion, essentially adopted the opinion of Advocate 
General Colomer, who opined that “marks also have a post-sale purpose.”  Id. at I-655. 
247 Ruiz-Picasso, 2006 E.C.R. at I-674 (emphasis added). 
248 See generally Opinion of Advocate General Colomer, supra note 243.  Note that the 
CJEU basically disagreed with the appellants on this issue by stating that the GC did not 
“in any way hold that the concept of likelihood of confusion under Articles 8(1)(b) and 
9(1)(b) must be interpreted differently.”  Ruiz-Picasso, 2006 E.C.R. at I-677. 
249 Opinion of the Advocate General Colomer, supra note 243, at I-655–56. 
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demand an analysis of post-sale confusion.”250  The Advocate General 
noted that the GC did not “take into account the perception of the public 
at times other than the moment of purchase, in particular subsequent to 
purchase, which may be relevant in an assessment of the likelihood of 
post-sale confusion.”251  Nevertheless, he would later suggest that “most 
writers do not accept that post-sale confusion is relevant when analysing 
the likelihood of confusion.”252  This statement is a bit odd because the 
CJEU would essentially adopt the Advocate General’s recommendation.  
However, it seems that he was indicating that writers are skeptical about 
the nature of post-sale confusion, even though it is an established 
European doctrine.  The Advocate General also suggested that if the 
court does not clarify the position of post-sale confusion in European 
trademark law, the legal academe will continue to be wary of post-sale 
confusion.253 
Though Ruiz-Picasso recognized post-sale confusion, its recognition 
was shrouded in poor analysis, and one way to interpret its construction 
of post-sale confusion was that it meant that “the average consumer’s 
level of attention is likely to vary according to the category of goods or 
services in question.”254  The argument can be made that the phrase 
“likely to vary” also includes post-sale confusion or, as the court further 
explained, the attention the consumer was “capable of displaying in 
different situations.”255  However, the Ruiz-Picasso court explained that 
post-sale confusion occurs when consumers “[come] across the goods 
after they had been sold and taken away from the place of sale, [and 
consumers] might interpret the sign affixed to those goods as 
designating the proprietor of the mark concerned as the undertaking of 
origin of the goods.”256 Consequently, the doctrine, as applied by the 
court in Ruiz-Picasso, will likely have a very limited impact on consumers 
who might purchase a PICARO motor vehicle, only later to be confused 
by the fact that the Picasso estate gave its blessing. 
                                                 
250 Id. at I-656. 
251 Id. at I-649–50 (footnote omitted). 
252 Id. at I-656 (footnote omitted). 
253 Id. (citing C. Baudenbacher & A. Naumann, Neuste Entwicklungen in der 
immaterialguterrechtlichen Rechtsprechung der Europaischen Gerichtschofe, in NEUSTE 
ENTWICKLUNGEN IM EUROPÄISCHEN UND INTERNATIONALEN IMMATERIALGÜTERRECH, 1–47 
(C. Baudenbacher & J. Simon eds., 2003)). 
254 Case C-361/04 P, Ruiz-Picasso v. OHIM, 2006 E.C.R. I-660, I-675 (emphasis added). 
255 Id. at I-676. 
256 Id. at I-677. 
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c. Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Budějovicky Budvar 
The battle for the beers in Anheuser-Busch is known all over the 
trademark world for a number of different reasons.257  It is lesser known, 
however, for its application of the post-sale confusion doctrine.  Budvar 
asked the CJEU for a preliminary ruling concerning the labeling it used 
to market beer in Finland.258  Anheuser-Busch argued that the Budvar 
labeling infringed its Budweiser, Bud, Bud Light, and Budweiser King of 
Beers trademarks, which it also owned in Finland.259  In 1996, the battle 
began in Finnish lower courts and ended up in the Finnish Supreme 
Court, which then asked the CJEU for a preliminary ruling.260  The CJEU 
then considered whether the owner “of a trade mark has an exclusive 
right to prevent a third party from using that trade name without his 
consent.”261 
Because the CJEU had already recognized post-sale confusion in 
Arsenal, it suggested in Anheuser-Busch that post-sale confusion was also 
a factor in determining likelihood of confusion, offering the following 
explanation: 
That is the case, in particular, where the use of that sign 
allegedly made by the third party is such as to create the 
impression that there is a material link in trade between 
the third party’s goods and the undertaking from which 
those goods originate.  It must be established whether the 
consumers targeted, including those who are confronted with 
the goods after they have left the third party’s point of sale, are 
likely to interpret the sign, as it is used by the third party, as 
designating or tending to designate the undertaking from 
which the third party’s goods originate . . . .262 
Thus, the ruling was not all that different from Arsenal.  The Budvar court 
later explained that, in order for the trademark owner to enjoy the 
                                                 
257 Case C-245/02, Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Budĕjovický Budvar, 2004 E.C.R. I-11018. 
258 Id. at 11020.  The Finnish dispute was only part of the battle for beers, which stretched 
across many countries “between the Czech brewery Budĕjovický Budvar . . . and the 
American company Anheuser-Busch Inc . . . concerning the right to use the words ‘Bud’, 
‘Budweiser’ and similar terms when marketing their various beers.”  Opinion of Advocate 
General Tizzano, Case C-245/02, Anheuser-Busch Inc., 2004 E.C.R. I-10993. 
259 Id. at I-11020–21, I-11030. 
260 Id. at I-11031–32. 
261 Id. at I-11041. 
262 Id. at I-11041–42 (emphasis added) (citing Case C-206/01, Arsenal Football Club plc v. 
Reed, 2002 E.C.R. I-10273, ¶ 56–57). 
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protection of Article 5(1)(b),263 he must be able to demonstrate likelihood 
of confusion.264  When Advocate General Tizzano cited Arsenal, he 
indicated what direction the court would go regarding post-sale 
confusion.265  One of the similarities between Arsenal and Anheuser-Busch 
was that the defendant knew or, at the very minimum, should have 
known that there could be cause for confusion among customers 
regarding the origin of its goods.266 
3. Post-Sale Confusion and Trademark Law’s State of Hibernation 
The cases discussed above create the epicenter for post-sale 
confusion in European trademark law.  Post-sale confusion is well 
established within the law of the CJEU and some member-states, but its 
establishment is not free from criticism.  Unlike the United States, where 
                                                 
263 Id. at I-11041.  The court noted: 
[I]t follows from the Court’s case-law on the definition of use by a 
third party, for which provision is made in Article 5(1) of that 
[trademark] directive, that the exclusive right conferred by a trade 
mark was intended to enable the trade mark proprietor to protect his 
specific interests as proprietor, that is, to ensure that the trade mark 
can fulfill its functions and that, therefore, the exercise of that right 
must be reserved to cases in which a third party’s use of the sign 
affects or is liable to affect the functions of the trade mark, in particular 
its essential function of guaranteeing to consumers the origin of the 
goods. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
264 Id. at I-11042.  The court stated: 
Where those conditions are satisfied, it follows from the case-law of the 
Court that, in the event of identity of the sign and the trade mark and 
of the goods or services, the protection conferred by Article 5(1)(a) of 
[the Trademark Directive] is absolute, whereas, in the situation 
provided for in Article 5(1)(b), the proprietor, in order to enjoy 
protection, must also prove that there is a likelihood of confusion on 
the part of the public because the signs and trade marks and the 
designated goods or services are identical or similar. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
265 Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano, supra note 258, at I-11006.  In addition, Tizzano 
stated: 
[W]here there is a similarity between the sign and the trade mark, even 
though they are not identical, Article 5(1)(b) makes the exercise of that 
right subject to the existence of a “likelihood of confusion on the part 
of the public, which includes the likelihood of association between the 
sign and the trade mark.” 
Id. at I-11007.  See id. at I-11008–09 (explaining further the steps the court needed to take in 
its post-sale confusion analysis). 
266 Id. at I-10999.  The sign read as follows, “BREWED AND BOTTLED BY BREWERY 
BUDWEISER BUDVAR NATIONAL ENTERPRISE,” and appeared on the labels below the 
trade mark in fine print.  Id. 
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the majority of the early post-sale confusion cases were related to luxury 
goods, the discussed European cases transcend all sectors.267  Dinwoodie 
and Janis argue that because the courts, in some instances, “distinguish[] 
between confusion among purchases and confusion among secondary 
viewers of the mark,” the courts often use secondary confusion, instead 
of post-sale confusion.268  The courts’ inconsistent descriptions of post-
sale confusion only add uncertainty to a doctrine that is still trying to 
make its way to the U.S. Supreme Court.  Because post-sale confusion is 
relatively new to European trademark jurisprudence, this variation in 
the language is not yet present.  Instead, European courts cryptically 
describe situations similar to post-sale confusion rather than explicitly 
mentioning it. 
The trouble with post-sale confusion is that it has receded to the 
sidelines in European trademark litigation.  Perhaps one reason for this 
trend is that the CJEU mistakenly believed the U.S. Supreme Court 
would address the post-sale confusion issue, because it was developing 
at a rapid speed in the U.S. circuit courts.269  This belief has failed to 
materialize thus far, and the CJEU has since ignored discussing post-sale 
confusion since the heydays of Arsenal, Picasso, and Anheuser.  However, 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s failure to address the issue may not be the only 
reason the CJEU is reluctant to formulate an adequate test for post-sale 
confusion. 
One could argue that neither the claimants nor the defendants raised 
any claims pertaining to post-sale confusion in these European 
trademark cases, or that the CJEU sees no need to go further than what 
was provided in Arsenal, which is its only major discussion on post-sale 
confusion.  Whichever path one could use to get to the debunktion 
junction (a famous line on a political TV show), there lurks a larger 
problem with post-sale confusion.  Whose interest does the doctrine of 
post-sale confusion serve—the consumer or the trademark owner?  
                                                 
267 See, e.g., Esercizio v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1237 (6th Cir. 1991) (accusing Roberts of 
trademark infringement when he built identical replicas of Ferrari sport cars); 
Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, Inc., 221 
F.2d 464, 465 (2d Cir. 1955) (challenging the sale of a copy of Vacheron Constantin’s Atmos 
clock by Mastercrafters); see Jenny T. Slocum & Jess M. Collen, The Evolving Threat and 
Enforcement of Replica Goods, 33 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 789, 801 (2011) (commenting on the 
interface between counterfeit and genuine goods).  Slocum and Collen explained that post-
sale confusion is harmful to trademark owners and that “[t]here is also significant harm to 
a consumer who is not aware the goods are fake, especially when purchasing goods from 
the secondary market.”  Id. 
268 DINWOODIE & JANIS, supra note 4, at 578 (citing Acad. of Motion Picture Arts & Scis. v. 
Creative House Promotions, Inc., 944 F.2d 1446 (9th Cir. 1991)) (emphasis added). 
269 See McCarthy, supra note 9, at 3356 n.172 (citing a host of cases where post-sale 
confusion was considered). 
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Trademarks serve two key roles:  (1) an identification of origin as to the 
good and (2) a quality signal for the consumer.270  Post-sale confusion 
will have to navigate its way through these two interests. 
In one of the earliest exposés on post-sale confusion, Anne McCarthy 
argued for the inclusion of the public when considering the likelihood of 
confusion as a result of post-sale confusion.271  Since the publication of 
her article, very little has been written on post-sale confusion.  The 
emerging scholarship since then has largely discussed post-sale 
confusion in relation to the “general public” or “the consumer.”272  
Unfortunately, this general discussion does not provide an answer to 
some of the fundamental problems of post-sale confusion.273  It is a 
possibility that legal scholars have favored a consumer-based focus, 
because the general mentality of the public can be summarized in the old 
adage, “the customer is always right.” 
Hermès International v. Lederer de Paris Fifth Avenue, Inc. reminds legal 
scholars that consumers are a unique group of people, because the law 
protects them from any possible confusion that may be harmful.274  
According to the court, “The creation of confusion in the post-sale 
context can be harmful in that if there are too many knockoffs in the 
market, sales of the originals may decline because the public is fearful 
that what they are purchasing may not be an original.”275  One 
commentator suggested that the rise of the post-sale confusion doctrine 
in U.S. trademark law was due in part to “the lack of a full 
misappropriation doctrine.”276  The courts’ recognition of post-sale 
confusion indicates that trademark infringement claims are not often 
made, perhaps due to a fear that trademark law is in a state of 
hibernation or because such claims will be difficult to prove.  Therefore, 
the courts should adopt a new approach to determine whether a product 
                                                 
270 See supra notes 40–45 and accompanying text (giving an example of how origin of 
goods and quality are connected). 
271 McCarthy, supra note 9, at 3361–68. 
272 E.g., Mark P. McKenna, A Consumer Decision-Making Theory of Trademark Law, 98 VA. L. 
REV. 67, 111 (2012) (discussing the need to focus on consumers when analyzing the 
effectiveness of trademark laws); see also Deborah R. Gerhardt, Consumer Investment in 
Trademarks, 88 N.C. L. REV. 427, 433–34 (2010) (arguing that consumer interests are often 
ignored or manipulated to conform to the interests of mark owners). 
273 See generally Jeremy N. Sheff, Veblen Brands, 96 MINN. L. REV. 769 (2012).  This is a 
relatively new piece of scholarship that offers a scathing critique of post-sale confusion.  Id. 
274 Hermès Int’l v. Lederer de Paris Fifth Ave., Inc., 219 F.3d 104, 107–08 (2d Cir. 2000). 
275 Id. at 108. 
276 Ansgar Ohly, Free Access, Including Freedom to Imitate, as a Legal Principle—A Forgotten 
Concept?, in THE STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW:  CAN ONE SIZE FIT ALL? 97, 
110 n.58 (Annette Kur & Vytautas Mizaras eds., 2011). 
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has caused a likelihood of confusion, but such an approach should begin 
by setting out clear factors for determining post-sale confusion. 
While it is natural to argue that trademark law and post-sale 
confusion concerns consumers, post-sale confusion has a more 
substantial impact on the trademark owner:  “Post-sale confusion is of 
considerable concern to brand owners for its ability to reduce the ability 
of a brand to guarantee the origin of goods or services, harm brand 
value, and lead to lost sales in the future.”277  When the argument shifts 
away from the consumers to trademark owners, then post-sale confusion 
reinforces the origin function of trademarks.  However, there is a catch.  
Consumers also desire the peace of mind conferred by a trademark 
about a product’s quality; therefore, post-sale confusion is juxtaposed 
between the origin function of trademarks and the quality function.278 
Consumerism demands regulatory protection.  Some jurisdictions, 
such as the EU and member-states, provide a number of regulations to 
help protect consumers.  Trademark law, which is one of many 
regulatory instruments, coexists with other regulatory doctrines, such as 
comparative advertising,279 unfair competition,280 passing off, 
misappropriation, antitrust law, and consumer protection law.281  When 
trademark law fights to coexist in this regulatory maze, it is an indication 
that trademark law is either in a state of hibernation, or that there is a 
need to amalgamate the various regulatory instruments in order to form 
a super code to protect consumers.  Consequently, trademark rights may 
need to be relegated to real property, detaching itself from the 
                                                 
277 O’Byrne & Allgrove, supra note 187, at 322. 
278 See generally Olsen, supra note 9. 
279 Council Directive 2006/114/EC, 2006 O.J. (L 376) 8. 
280 Gesetz Gegen Den Unlauteren Wettbewerb [UWG] [German Law Against Unfair 
Competition], July 3, 2004, BGBL. I at 1414 (Ger.).  See generally FRAUKE HENNING-BODEWIG, 
UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW:  EUROPEAN UNION AND MEMBER STATES (2006) (explaining that 
unfair competition law only regulates a portion of the broad concept of unfair competition); 
Manuela Finger & Sandra Schmieder, The New Law Against Unfair Competition:  An 
Assessment, 6 GER. L.J. 201 (2005) (assessing the German Law Against Unfair Competition 
through an analysis of the legislative history, intent, and scope of the law); Jens Matthes, 
Germany—Unfair Competition:  Your Flexible Friend, LINKLATERS (July 19, 2011), 
http://www.linklaters.com/Publications/Publication1392Newsletter/July_2011/Pages/G
ermany_Unfair_Competition_Flexible_Friend.aspx (providing an example of how some 
practitioners have heralded the new German unfair competition law as flexible). 
281 E.g., Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 2005/29, 2005 O.J. (L 149), 22–39 (EC) 
(regulating commercial practices that result in unfair competition); see Jennifer Davis, 
Unfair Competition Law in the United Kingdom, in LAW AGAINST UNFAIR COMPETITION:  
TOWARDS A NEW PARADIGM IN EUROPE?  183, 186 (Reto M. Hilty & Frauke Henning-
Bodewig eds., 2007) (“[T]he government makes it clear that the [Unfair Commercial 
Practices Directive] affects the relationship between the consumer and the trader, and is, 
indeed, primarily concerned with consumer protection not with business relationships.”). 
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intellectual property system, so that it can survive and in order for 
proprietors to effectively prosecute trespassers. 
If post-sale confusion has been a mainstay of American trademark 
law for more than a century, then it would seem naïve to assert that the 
doctrine is undeveloped.  In fact, the post-sale confusion doctrine has 
passed its maturity stage, but the problem is that the U.S. Supreme Court 
is reluctant to apply the doctrine.  But should the courts be blamed for 
this lack of implementation, or is it simply that the doctrine is not well 
liked or understood?  Should claimants use other arguments, for 
example, when trying to prove post-sale confusion?  Are there different 
methodologies that should be adopted or particular effects that need to 
be gauged?  This Article suggests that a set of principles are needed to 
determine post-sale confusion, and courts in Europe and the United 
States need to look to the Polaroid factors for a solution. 
4. Post-Sale Confusion in the Era of Counterfeiting 
Post-sale confusion is quite developed in European trademark law, 
but there is a problem simmering in the foreground of trademark 
infringement cases:  The CJEU has not given clear guidance on post-sale 
confusion.  Clearer guidelines are needed so that the lower courts in 
member-states may interpret and appropriately apply the doctrine.  
Though Arsenal introduced post-sale confusion to European trademark 
jurisprudence, its application by the courts in Ruiz-Picasso and Anheuser-
Busch added little clarity.  These two decisions acknowledged the 
existence of post-sale confusion but failed to provide a formal analysis.  
Though the Ruiz-Picasso decision was not entirely clear in its application 
of the doctrine, it highlighted post-sale confusion in opposition 
procedures.282  When the doctrine was initially construed in the United 
States, the circuit courts were quick to adopt post-sale confusion, 
building a consistent body of case law, despite taking different 
approaches.283  In Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences v. Creative 
House Promotions, for instance, the Ninth Circuit explained that “[p]ost-
sale confusion occurs when consumers view a product outside the 
context in which it is originally distributed and confuse it with another, 
similar product.”284  The CJEU could adopt a similar approach, 
providing some guidance as to how post-sale confusion would affect 
consumers. 
                                                 
282 See supra Part III.B.2.b (analyzing the Ruiz-Picasso decision). 
283 See McCarthy, supra note 9, at 3356 n.172 (citing a host of cases where post-sale 
confusion was considered). 
284 Acad. of Motion Picture Arts & Scis. v. Creative House Promotions, Inc., 944 F.2d 
1446, 1455 (9th Cir. 1991). 
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Despite the established case law on post-sale confusion related to 
European trademark law, no evidence suggests that post-sale confusion 
has been formulated to protect the intellectual property rights of luxury 
good owners against counterfeiting.  Courts in the United States have 
applied the post-sale confusion doctrine as a way to combat 
counterfeiting.  When comparing how the doctrine of post-sale confusion 
has been treated at the highest judicial level in Europe and the United 
States, one telling difference emerges:  The U.S. Supreme Court has not 
endorsed the doctrine yet, whereas the CJEU has. 
It is possible, however, to argue that the lower courts in Europe 
made passing attempts to link post-sale confusion with luxury brands.  
For instance, in L’Oreal v. Bellure, the court suggested that the junior 
mark would cause post-sale confusion.285  But as trademark law 
continues to face new challenges and with the counterfeiting of luxury 
brands on the rise, there is good reason for post-sale confusion to emerge 
from the sidelines and become a dominant arbiter in determining 
trademark infringement cases.  Unfortunately, discussing those 
arguments would go beyond the scope of this Article; thus, this Article 
focuses next on one aspect of trademark law that is still puzzling—
blurring and how post-sale confusion fits into this puzzle. 
IV.  BLURRING AND POST-SALE CONFUSION 
The final limb in the trajectory of European post-sale confusion is 
blurring, which is situated in the wider cosmos of dilution.  For 
illustrative purposes, the trajectory can be described as:  Origin Function 
> Similarities of Marks > Post-Sale Confusion > Dilution (Blurring).  It 
is assumed that the reader has an understanding of trademark functions, 
because the issue of origin function, which indicates quality, is not 
thoroughly discussed in this Article.286 
After exposing the similarities of marks and post-sale confusion 
above, we are now at the edge of the cosmos pursuing the blurring 
meteoroid.  This elusive meteoroid may hold answers when determining 
post-sale confusion, its relation to dilution, and whether blurring may 
                                                 
285 Case C-487/07, L’Oréal v. Bellure NV, 2009 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS ¶ 47 (June 18, 
2009); see Chai, supra note 188, at 378 (“The [post-sale confusion] doctrine should only be 
applied to protect designer fragrances which have acquired secondary meaning. . . . The 
doctrine should only be applied to enjoin the manufacture of knockoff fragrances which 
create a likelihood of confusion.”). 
286 But see sources cited supra notes 30–34 (discussing key principles used in assessing the 
requirement of likelihood of confusion). 
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develop substantially in the universe of European trademark law.287  In 
Premier Brands UK Ltd. v. Typhoon Europe Ltd., the court explained that 
blurring occurs when the distinctiveness of a mark is eroded.288  This 
section attempts to frame the dilutive harm of blurring within the 
context of post-sale confusion. 
A. Blurring—The Gospel According to Schechter 
Frank Schechter may be credited for single handedly advocating, 
and perhaps developing, the notion of dilution, which includes 
blurring.289  Blurring occurs when new entrants in the competition for 
goods attempt to market their goods and services in a manner that is 
often at the detriment of a more well-known mark.290  In his thesis, 
                                                 
287 Council Directive 2008/95EC, art. 4(4)(a), 2008 O.J. (L 299) (referring to dilution as a 
detriment to the distinctive character of the earlier mark); see Case C-252/07, Intel Corp., 
Inc. v. CPM U.K. Ltd., 2008 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS ¶¶ 16, 29 (Nov. 27, 2008) (referring to 
dilution as a detriment to the distinctive character of the earlier mark); see also Opinion of 
Advocate General Sharpston, Case C-252/07, Intel Corp., Inc. v. CPM U.K. Ltd, EUR-Lex 
CELEX LEXIS ¶ 11 (June 26, 2008) (“Two types of dilution are commonly recognised:  
blurring and tarnishment.  Broadly, [dilution] corresponds to the notion of detriment to the 
distinctive character of the earlier mark in Article 4(4)(a) of the [Trademark] 
Directive . . . while [tarnishment] corresponds to that of detriment to its repute . . . .”).  Id.  
See generally Brian W. Borchert, Note, Imminent Domain Name:  The Technological Land-Grab 
and ICANN’s Lifting of Domain Name Restrictions, 45 VAL. U. L. REV. 505 (2011) (discussing 
the Federal Trademark Dilution Act and its subsequent amendments and explaining the 
standard a plaintiff must meet in order to prove dilution). 
288 Premier Brands UK Ltd. v. Typhoon Eur. Ltd. & Another, 2000 E.T.M.R. 1071, 1093. 
289 Frank Schechter, The Rational Basis for Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813 
(1927).  It should be noted that the anti-dilution doctrine existed in Europe before Schechter 
penned his thesis, discussing the well-known German case, Odol.  Id. at 831–32.  However, 
he stated that “the Odol doctrine hails from a country where registration creates an 
‘incontestable right,’ whereas in the United States and Great Britain registration is purely 
procedural and creates no rights . . . .”  Id. at 832–33 (footnote omitted).  See Mathias 
Strasser, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection Revisited:  Putting the Dilution Doctrine into 
Context, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 375, 404–06 (2000) (discussing the 
history of the dilution doctrine); Soyoung Yook, Trademark Dilution in European Union, 11 
INT’L LEGAL PERSP. 223, 223 (2001) (“Even though the dilution theory was born in Europe, it 
has been developed in the U.S.”).  See generally Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, 
875 F.2d 1026, 1035 (2d Cir. 1989) (discussing the development of six factors to create a 
standard for blurring).  In 1999, the Second Circuit created a new case-by-case standard to 
analyze dilution cases.  Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 227–28 (2d Cir. 1999). 
290 “Dilution by blurring” is defined in the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 as 
an “association arising from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous 
mark that impairs the distinctiveness of the famous mark.”  Trademark Dilution Revision 
Act of 2006, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B) (2006).  See also Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 511 
(7th Cir. 2002) (providing an additional definition for blurring).  Perryman discussed a 
possible issue associated with dilution: 
[T]here is concern that consumer search costs will rise if a trademark 
becomes associated with a variety of unrelated products.  Suppose an 
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Schechter wrote twenty-eight words defining blurring, and his definition 
continues to stand the test of time on what seems like unshakeable 
grounds:  “It is the gradual whittling away or dispersion of the identity 
and hold upon the public mind of the mark or name by its use upon non-
competing goods.”291  This is Schechter’s gospel of dilution, which forms 
the holy narrative for blurring in modern trademark law. 
The gospel of dilution and blurring has evoked tension among 
scholars of law and regulation of private goods and commerce, which is 
embodied broadly in trademark law.  On the one hand, the dilution and 
blurring gospel has been codified into laws, forming the biblical truth in 
trademark harm for trademark owners.292  On the other hand, the 
atheists and other non-believers reject the gospel.293  This latter group—
                                                                                                             
upscale restaurant calls itself “Tiffany.”  There is little danger that the 
consuming public will think it’s dealing with a branch of the Tiffany 
jewelry store if it patronizes this restaurant.  But when consumers next 
see the name “Tiffany” they may think about both the restaurant and 
the jewelry store, and if so the efficacy of the name as an identifier of 
the store will be diminished.  Consumers will have to think harder—
incur as it were a higher imagination cost—to recognize the name as 
the name of the store. . . . So “blurring” is one form of dilution. 
Id. 
291 Schechter, supra note 289, at 825. 
292 See, e.g., Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006) (providing injunctive 
relief for trademark owners); Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1125(c)(2)(B) (2006) (amending the Trademark Act of 1946 to address dilution by 
blurring).  The Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 (“TDRA”) replaced the earlier law 
enacted by Congress, the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (“FTDA”), which amended the 
Lanham Act for bringing Dilution claims.  Id.  Prior to the enactment of the first dilution 
act, a number of states had dilution laws.  See Brian Lerner, Note, Sneaking Through the Back 
Door with Pepperidge Farm:  The Monopoly Advantage of Dilution, 20 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 
429, 439 n.90 (2000) (citing state dilution statutes that existed before FTDA).  See generally 
The Dilution Debate: The Global Analysis of Dilution, WORLDEXTRA, May 2008, 
http://static.informaprofessional.com/ipwo/images/supplements/INTA_May08.pdf 
(discussing the current global debate on dilution); FHIMA, supra note 41 (providing a recent 
comparative discussion on dilution).  The replacement of the FTDA by the TDRA was 
primarily a result of the Supreme Court’s interpretation in Moseley, where the court held 
that proof of actual harm to the value of a well-known mark was required before the FTDA 
could grant relief.  Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 433 (2003).  See 
generally Joseph J. Galvano, Note, There is No “Rational Basis” for Keeping It a “Secret” 
Anymore:  Why the FTDA’S “Actual Harm” Requirement Should Not Be Interpreted the Same 
Way for Dilution Caused by Blurring as It Is for Dilution Caused by Tarnishing, 31 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 1213 (2003) (providing an analysis of Moseley). 
293 These skeptics mostly include scholars; however, some courts are also skeptical.  See, 
e.g., Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Celozzi-Ettelson Chevrolet, 
Inc., 855 F.2d 480, 484 (7th Cir. 1988) (“Dilution is an infection which, if allowed to spread, 
will inevitably destroy the advertising value of the mark.”); see David J. Franklyn, 
Debunking Dilution Doctrine:  Toward a Coherent Theory of the Anti-Free-Rider Principle in 
American Trademark Law, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 117, 119 (2004) (providing an example of a 
skeptical academic).  See generally Robert G. Bone, Schechter’s Ideas in Historical Context and 
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made up mostly of legal academics and rogue courts critical of 
dilution—did not enjoy the luxury of enacting laws, while the former 
group—trademark owners—seeks comfort in the fact that there is a 
degree of constitutional protection for their property.294  Once dilution 
was recognized by the law at the federal level and co-existed with the 
already enacted state dilution statues, it was time for the U.S. Supreme 
Court to offer some guidance and interpretation on what constitutes 
dilution harm. 
In Moseley, the Supreme Court interpreted dilution very narrowly, 
stating that blurring was “not a necessary consequence of mental 
association” and that the law “requires a showing of actual dilution.”295  
By this reasoning, the Supreme Court rejected the likelihood of confusion 
test, holding that the evidence provided was not sufficient to support 
dilution by blurring.296  Even though there was legislation in place to 
protect the gospel of blurring according to Schechter, even the U.S. 
Supreme Court could not interpret what Schechter meant by the 
“gradual whittling away . . . of the mark.”297 
                                                                                                             
Dilution’s Rocky Road, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. 469 (2008) (providing a 
general overview of the skepticism surrounding Schechter’s dilution theory); Kathleen B. 
McCabe, Note, Dilution-by-Blurring:  A Theory Caught in the Shadow of Trademark 
Infringement, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1827 (2000) (illustrating further skepticism of Schechter’s 
dilution theory). 
294 Pamela S. Karlan, Constitutional Law as Trademark, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 385, 394–95 
(2009) (arguing that “there is a serious problem with letting a mark holder squelch criticism 
by denying critics the ability to make their case using the most effective possible 
language[,]” and that the manner in which “labels operate in constitutional arguments also 
has interesting parallels with trademark law”); see Laura R. Bradford, Emotion, Dilution, and 
the Trademark Consumer, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1227, 1250 (2008) (proposing a form of truce 
because, as she argues, both sides of the dilution debate avoided a discussion of emotion, 
and there has been a “failure to communicate a coherent harm for dilution by blurring”).  
As optimistic as Bradford is, I cannot share one of her claims that “blurring eases barriers to 
entry,” because the junior mark does not add anything innovative.  Id. at 1287.  On the 
contrary, it often adapts a similar or near identical mark to the senior mark.  Id.  If anything, 
blurring, viewed through the lens of competition law or antitrust, distorts the competitive 
process.  But such a claim by Bradford is best supported by the argument of comparative 
advertising.  See Brian A. Jacobs, Note, Trademark Dilution on the Constitutional Edge, 104 
COLUM. L. REV. 161, 165 (2004) (suggesting “a constitutionally adequate ‘efficiency test’ for 
dilution”).  See generally P. Sean Morris, Trade Marks External Costs (2011) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with the author).  This was presented at the Society of Legal Scholars 
Annual Conference on September 10–14, 2011, in Bristol, UK. 
295 Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 433–34 (2003).  See generally Julie C. 
Frymark, Note, Trademark Dilution:  A Proposal to Stop the Infection from Spreading, 38 VAL. U. 
L. REV. 165 (2003) (noting that the Supreme Court’s decision in Moseley had a detrimental 
effect on the dilution doctrine in American courts).  
296 Moseley, 537 U.S. at 433. 
297 Schechter, supra note 289, at 825. 
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Schechter’s gospel on blurring has been debated ever since he 
penned Rational Basis for Trademark Protection.  The various disciples—the 
legislature and judiciary—vociferously spread the gospel; however, 
because of inconsistencies in the blurring doctrine, the dilution by 
blurring idea was established for the most part by trial and error and 
could be perfected only with specific standards and parameters.  
Nevertheless, Schechter’s dilution and blurring doctrine matured from 
its Odol origins in Germany, was fine-tuned in the United States, and 
then spread beyond the shores of the United States to the EU and other 
countries.298  With this in mind, the next section explains how the 
dilution by blurring doctrine matured, as well as its relation to post-sale 
confusion in the EU, of which Germany is now a part. 
B. Intel and the European Construction of Schechter’s Blurring 
Intel Corp. Inc. v. CPM United Kingdom Ltd. made its way to the CJEU 
and later equated the idea of detriment to the distinctive character as 
blurring, stating that such detriment has always been “referred to as 
‘dilution,’ ‘whittling away’ or ‘blurring.’”299  The CJEU’s language was 
Schechterian gospel in its purest form, which evoked, reinforced, and 
entrenched what was originally a European doctrine.300  If the language 
in Article 4(4)(a) of the TMD was not clear enough regarding the link 
between “detriment to the distinctive character” and blurring, then the 
CJEU in Intel made sure that there were no uncertainties and that 
detriment to the distinctive character equated to blurring.301  
Furthermore, by adopting the Schechterian language of blurring, the 
CJEU ensured that as European trademark law matured, it would 
mature on the same path as the more developed American trademark 
law.   
                                                 
298 Id. at 831–33. 
299 Case C-252/07, Intel Corp. Inc. v. CPM U.K. Ltd., 2008 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS ¶ 29 
(Nov. 27, 2008).  In Interflora, Inc. v. Marks & Spencer plc., the advocate general made the 
following observation about dilution in European trademark: 
As to the terminology, it seems . . . that in EU trade mark law dilution 
in the wide sense comprises blurring . . . .  Blurring (or whittling away or 
dilution in the narrow sense) means use that can lead to a process of 
dilution of the trade mark in the strict sense, i.e. diminishing of the 
distinctiveness of the trade mark. 
Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen, Case C-323/09, Interflora, Inc. v. Marks & Spencer 
plc., 2011 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS ¶ 54 (Mar. 24, 2011) (emphasis in original). 
300 See Morris, supra note 294 (making similar arguments regarding external costs and 
trademarks). 
301 Intel Corp., 2008 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS ¶ 76. 
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The CJEU, however, did not conduct a thorough analysis of blurring 
in Schechterian language; instead, it was Advocate General Sharpston 
who framed blurring in Schechterian language, drawing a comparative 
analysis with the United States: 
The courts in the United States, where owners of certain 
marks have been protected against dilution for some 
time, have added richly to the lexicon of dilution, 
describing it in terms of lessening, watering down, 
debilitating, weakening, undermining, blurring, eroding 
and insidious gnawing away at a trade mark.  The 
essence of dilution in this classic sense is that the 
blurring of the distinctiveness of the mark means that it 
is no longer capable of arousing intermediate association 
with the goods for which it is registered and used.302 
The Advocate General further explained that there has to be a mental 
link between the marks in the mind of consumers for blurring to occur: 
The link is a precondition for examining the existence of 
blurring and, when the public does establish a link 
between the two marks, it may well be that the first step 
on the road to blurring has been taken, but other factors 
and evidence are needed to determine whether actual 
detriment is caused to distinctive character.303 
This treatment of blurring also indicated how the CJEU would add its 
own discussion on blurring.304  The English High Court referred the Intel 
                                                 
302 Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, supra note 287, ¶ 33. 
303 Id. ¶ 70; see also id. ¶¶ 42, 45, 76 (expanding on the elements necessary to prove 
blurring). 
304 See Intel Corp., 2008 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS ¶ 76 (“[D]etriment to the distinctive 
character of the earlier mark is caused when that mark’s ability to identify the goods or 
services for which it is registered and used as coming from the proprietor of that mark is 
weakened . . . .”); see also Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen, supra note 299, ¶ 80  
(providing an in-depth discussion of blurring).  The court stated: 
Blurring refers thus to the use of a sign identical with or similar to a 
trade mark with a reputation in a fashion that is likely to weaken its 
distinctiveness by decreasing its capacity to distinguish goods and 
services.  At the end of the process of blurring (or dilution in the strict 
sense) the trade mark is no longer capable of creating an association in 
the minds of consumers of the existence of an economic link between a 
specific commercial source of certain goods or services and the trade 
mark.  Therefore, what is at stake is the very capacity of a sign to serve 
as a trade mark, or in other words the identification or distinguishing 
function of the trade mark. 
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case to the CJEU in order to determine the relevant criteria “for the 
purposes of establishing whether there is a link . . . between the earlier 
mark with a reputation and the later mark.”305  The referring court 
suggested some factors for the CJEU to consider and sought guidance on 
other factors it should consider when determining whether blurring has 
occurred.306  Rather than create a definitive test for blurring, the CJEU 
lamented the shortcomings of the factors suggested by the English High 
Court.307 
The CJEU included in its analysis a discussion of post-sale confusion, 
stating that an inquiry into the strength of the senior mark may be 
necessary “to determine whether that reputation extends beyond the public 
targeted by that mark.”308  The Court later elaborated that “a link between 
the conflicting marks is necessarily established when there is a likelihood 
of confusion.”309  This reasoning appears to indicate some degree of 
                                                                                                             
 
Blurring or dilution in this sense primarily means that the 
distinctiveness of the trade mark is ‘watered’ down (‘Verwässerung’ in 
German) as the trade mark becomes banal. 
Id. ¶¶ 80–81(footnote omitted). 
305 Intel Corp., 2008 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS ¶ 40. 
306 Id. ¶ 42.  The factors were in the guise of the questions referred to by the CJEU.  
Paragraph twenty-three of the judgment lists the questions as: 
(1) For the purposes of Article 4(4)(a) of the [Directive], where:  
 
(a) the earlier mark has a huge reputation for certain specific types 
of goods or services, 
 
(b) those goods or services are dissimilar or dissimilar to a 
substantial degree to the goods or services of the later mark [or the 
degree of distinctiveness], 
 
(c) the earlier mark is unique in respect of any goods or services, 
 
(d) the earlier mark would be brought to mind by the average 
consumer when he or she encounters the later mark used for 
services of the later mark,  
 
are those facts sufficient in themselves to establish . . . a link . . . ? 
Id. ¶ 23 (emphasis added).  The referring court then asked in part two of the question if the 
answer is negative:  “[W]hat factors is the national court to take into account in deciding 
whether such is sufficient?”  Id. 
307 See id. ¶ 80 (stating that the factors were “not sufficient to establish that the use of the 
later mark takes or would take unfair advantage of, or is or would be detrimental to, the 
distinctive character or the repute of the earlier mark”).  According to one scholar, it is 
“unfortunate that the Court did not inject more certainty into this troubled area.”  FHIMA, 
supra note 41, at 141. 
308 Intel Corp., 2008 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS ¶ 53 (emphasis added). 
309 Id. ¶ 57. 
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relationship between blurring and confusion (and hence post-sale 
confusion), and such a relationship can only be true once a link had been 
established. 
C. Haute Couture v. Guess Girl:  Blurring and Post-Sale Confusion 
The CJEU nearly established a nexus between blurring and post-sale 
confusion in Intel, but the decision was unclear as to how to do so.310  The 
Court should have turned to one of the many cases in the United States, 
such as Nabisco,311 where courts found that dilution by blurring occurred 
in a post-sale context.312 
Gucci America, Inc. v. Guess?, Inc. provides a prime example of the 
connection between post-sale confusion and blurring, when the court 
found that Guess infringed Gucci’s trademark due to “dilution by 
blurring.”313  The case had all the ingredients for post-sale confusion, 
ranging from knock-offs to other brazen attempts by Guess to “Gucci-fy” 
its products, which even included an odd “rabbi” who allegedly sold 
“counterfeit Gucci products to benefit his synagogue.”314  The Gucci 
trademarks symbolize luxury, whereas the Guess trademarks symbolize 
mid-range luxury and are an imitation of Gucci products.  This may 
cause post-sale confusion due to the luxurious nature of the senior mark, 
and also because the potential consumer who sees Mr. and Mrs. 
Highflyerberg wearing Guess’s Gucci-fied products may think they 
originated with Gucci because of the similarity to Gucci’s iconic designs.   
Gucci, the proprietor of the senior marks, sued Guess and its cohorts 
for infringement.315  Although the court found that a Guess licensee 
intentionally copied Gucci’s iconic Green/Red/Green (“GRG”) stripe 
and that Gucci instructed Guess to stop producing the infringing 
product, the court held that Guess’s Brown/Red/Brown stripe was 
                                                 
310 Id. 
311 Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 218 (2d Cir. 1999); see also I.P. Lund 
Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 44 (1st Cir. 1998); Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Craftex, 
Inc., 816 F.2d 145, 148 (4th Cir. 1987) (both discussing the likelihood of post-sale confusion 
due to dilution by blurring). 
312 See Robert G. Bone, Enforcement Costs and Trademark Puzzles, 90 VA. L. REV. 2099, 2120 
n.65 (2004). 
313 Gucci Am., Inc. v. Guess?, Inc., No. 09 Civ. 4373(SAS), 2012 WL 2304247, at *31 
(S.D.N.Y. June 18, 2012); see also Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 588 F.3d 
97, 113 (2d Cir. 2009) (discussing the role of parody in dilution by blurring); DINWOODIE & 
JANIS, supra note 4, 635–46. 
314 Gucci, 2012 WL 2304247, at *1, *13.  Gucci sued Guess for infringing on five Gucci 
designs:  the GRG Stripe [a well-known mark], the Repeating GG Pattern [interlocking GG] 
(along with the Diamond Motif Trade Dress), the Stylized G, and the Script Gucci).  Id. at 
*3. 
315 Id. at *1. 
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“visually dissimilar from the GRG Stripe and will not cause confusion, 
even in the post-sale context.”316  But the court’s ruling did not mean that 
all was lost where post-sale confusion was concerned.  If anything, the 
court demonstrated how it would then treat Gucci’s post-sale confusion 
claims.317  The court continued to criticize post-sale confusion and 
argued that even though the alleged Guess knock-off shoes looked alike, 
they would not cause post-sale confusion due to the lack of 
similarities.318  This reasoning was somewhat odd given that in other 
circumstances one factor for determining confusion was the similarity of 
the goods, signs, or services.319  Even in dilution claims, there must be a 
degree of similarity between the junior and senior mark to conjure a 
likelihood of association and to lead the court to make a dilution 
determination.320 
Another important aspect of the court’s decision dealt with 
consumer surveys.321  The extent of the importance of consumer surveys 
has been controversial and Gucci continues to raise doubts regarding 
their use.  The court initially rejected a consumer survey, but later 
reversed that decision and re-admitted the survey into evidence, because 
it served a particular purpose regarding “the narrow issue of post-sale 
consumer confusion.”322  Gucci alleged that Guess’s Quattro G bags 
inflicted post-sale confusion on its senior mark, because it would have 
been difficult for “the casual observer” to see the junior marks’ 
ornamentation “in post-sale situations.”323 
                                                 
316 Id. at *8.  Gucci’s stripe consists of Green/Red/Green.  Id. at *1. The court also found 
that post-sale confusion was unlikely regarding the Stylized G, where Guess used similar 
patterns in a Square G on its products.  Id. at *11.  The court stated, “While the Square Gs 
on the shoes have the word ‘Guess’ on them, I find that a casual observer in a typical post-
sale setting is not likely to notice such markings.”  Id.  The Court also discussed evidence of 
expert witnesses following copying trends in the fashion industry and discussed how far 
such copying may go:  “While the law allows emulation of successful product features in 
order to spur competition and benefit consumers, it prohibits emulation from crossing over 
into copying that causes consumer confusion.”  Id. at *14. 
317 Id. at *19–21. 
318 Id. at *8. 
319 See supra notes 46–51 (taking into account similarity in order to determine whether 
post-sale confusion is likely to occur). 
320 E.g., Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, 875 F.2d 1026, 1029 (2d Cir. 1989) 
(holding that no claim of dilution would exist if there was not a significant similarity 
between marks). 
321 See generally Shashank Upadhye, Trademark Surveys:  Identifying the Relevant Universe of 
Confused Consumers, 8 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 550 (1997). 
322 Gucci, 2012 WL 2304247, at *15 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
323 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  According to the court, “[T]hirty-seven 
percent of women . . . carry handbags on which no source-identifying ornamentation can 
be seen in the post-sale context . . . .  [T]he maximum level of confusion amongst casual 
observers in the post-sale setting is 5.8 percent.”  Id. 
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In its analysis of the law, the court reasoned that the harm addressed 
by the post-sale confusion was not a “misdirected purchase, but a 
purchase intended to confuse.”324  The court stated that “a post-sale 
confusion plaintiff must still establish a likelihood of confusion among 
an appreciable number of post-sale observers, taking into account all the 
vagaries involved with post-sale observation.”325  The court opined that 
the Polaroid factors, though not exhaustive, are to be considered when 
determining the likelihood of confusion and, more specifically, post-sale 
confusion.326  Guess was in hot water from the beginning, because it was 
a “trend follower” and not a “trend leader,”327 which gave rise to the 
need for “brand cohesion and aesthetics.”328  This led to a failure to 
individually clear products that conflicted with Gucci’s intellectual 
property rights. 
In the end, however, Guess triumphed on the issue of post-sale 
confusion.  Neither party presented evidence on the sophistication of the 
casual observer in the post-sale setting; nevertheless, this factor favored 
Guess, especially in relation to the interlocking GGs, Gucci’s repeating G, 
and Guess’ Quattro G.329  The court reasoned that it was the “general 
viewing public” who mattered.330  Ultimately, Gucci proved trademark 
infringement due to post-sale confusion regarding the Stylized G.331 
The Gucci case shows the extent to which post-sale confusion has 
developed within trademark law and practice.  It also highlights some of 
the practical issues facing litigants and courts when analyzing post-sale 
confusion.  It is interesting to note the divergent paths that both the 
CJEU and the U.S. Supreme Court have taken on this issue.  On the one 
hand, the European high court recognizes post-sale confusion as 
actionable, while the U.S. Supreme Court remains silent on the issue.  
Even if a case involving post-sale confusion were to reach the U.S. 
Supreme Court, it would be hard to predict how the Court would decide 
the issue.  The circuit and district courts have reached various 
conclusions on the issue of post-sale confusion, and it is unclear as to 
what factors the Court would consider in reaching a conclusion on the 
issue.  Proving post-sale confusion remains difficult and additional 
                                                 
324 Id. at *19. 
325 See id. (“[T]he fact that post-sale observers are removed from purchasing decisions 
makes post-sale trademark cases inherently difficult to prove, speculative, and subject to 
increased scrutiny.”) (footnotes omitted). 
326 Id. at *20. 
327 Id. at *5. 
328 Id. at *6. 
329 Id. at *25. 
330 Id. at *26. 
331 Id. at *29. 
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factors could prove useful; however, this would set the Supreme Court 
on a collision path with Moseley.  Fortunately, the law is an ever-evolving 
creature, and one decision has the ability to correct previous judgments 
that are unfriendly to post-sale confusion-related litigation. 
In terms of dilution by blurring and post-sale confusion, the focus 
must be on creating a standard set of factors for proving post-sale 
confusion.  Only when a standard exists can the courts properly treat 
dilution by blurring in a post-sale confusion issue.  Currently, the courts 
have recognized that post-sale confusion is actionable; however, the 
courts have failed to clarify how post-sale confusion affects a senior 
mark and the effect of such an injury on dilution claims.  Nevertheless, 
the answer may be in the doctrine of blurring since confusion “lessens 
distinction,” especially when “consumers confuse the junior mark with 
the senior” mark.332 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The cases discussed above highlight how post-sale confusion has 
worked its way through the European judicial system.  However, courts, 
like the CJEU in Arsenal, unconvincingly addressed post-sale 
confusion.333  Therefore, the CJEU must develop a form-factor test to 
ensure a smooth application of post-sale confusion by the lower courts.  
Merely stating that post-sale confusion is one of the determinants of the 
likelihood of confusion fails to provide a sound footing for European 
trademark jurisprudence.334 
In the ten years since Arsenal, the post-sale confusion doctrine has 
fallen off the CJEU’s radar.  For a doctrine of such significance, this is 
unacceptable when European trademark jurisprudence remains a 
maturing phenomenon.  The CJEU often suffers from a “yes minister” 
syndrome, meaning that the CJEU usually adopts and follows doctrines 
that emanate from the U.S. courts.  Although no evidence exists to 
suggest that the CJEU adopted the doctrine of post-sale confusion from 
the U.S. circuit courts, the CJEU is now in a position to shed the “yes 
minister” syndrome.  In doing so, the CJEU could lead the way on the 
use of the post-sale confusion doctrine in trademark jurisprudence by 
adopting clear tests clarifying what constitutes post-sale confusion, when 
                                                 
332 Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 221 (2d Cir. 1999). 
333 See supra notes 228–41 and accompanying text (discussing the court’s decision in 
Arsenal). 
334 See Weberndörfer, supra note 173, at 255 (“The exact scope of [post-sale confusion] is 
however neither abstractly defined nor absolutely harmonised, since the judicial circuits do 
not agree with one another in a number of questions and have only little guidance from 
Congress or the Supreme Court.”) (footnote omitted). 
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it occurs, where it occurs, why it occurs, how it occurs, and which 
consumers are actually affected.  The CJEU must develop its own 
“Polaroid moment” for post-sale confusion. 
The CJEU must take the lead by developing a form-factor test for the 
doctrine of post-sale confusion.  Consequently, post-sale confusion is 
essential for preventing counterfeiting, and it also enforces the origin 
function of trademarks so that consumers remain confident in the 
communicative aspect of a trademark.  Furthermore, articulating a 
coherent form-factor test for post-sale confusion pertaining to the 
likelihood of confusion would standardize how the likelihood of 
confusion is determined.  Ultimately, it would ensure that there is a 
degree of certainty within the European Union concerning post-sale 
confusion. 
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